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Ruenger v. Soodsma3/31/2005
ext of the entire policy, and we invalidated the entire clause on that basis. Second, and more importantly, as indicated in Remiszewski, Folkman does not permit invalidating a clause because of an inconsistency that is not material to the issue in dispute. 276 Wis. 2d 167, -17. To the extent that our decision in Hanson can be read to do that, we must follow Folkman, not Hanson. See Madison Reprographics, Inc. v. Cook's Reprographics, Inc., 203 Wis. 2d 226, 238, 552 N.W.2d 440 (Ct. App. 1996) (when a court of appeals decision conflicts with a supreme court decision, the court of appeals must follow the supreme court decision).
We conclude that Van Erden and Remiszewski are controlling. Following Van Erden, we conclude that the addition of "or similar law" does not expand the reducing clause beyond that authorized by WIS. STAT.§ 632.32(5)(i). Following Van Erden and Remiszewski, we conclude that the reducing clause is not invalid in its entirety simply because of language that does not track the statute, if that language is not relied on by Rural in this case. Rural seeks to reduce the UIM limit by the amount paid on behalf of Soodsma, who was legally liable for Ruenger's injuries; that is permitted by § 632.32(5)(i) and by the language of the reducing clause. Thus, even if the language in the reducing clause might arguably permit reduction by an amount paid by one legally liable for something other than the injury, as Ruenger contends, that does not make the entire clause invalid. Similarly, even if the statement in the declarations failed to specify the sources in the statute, that does not preclude Rural from reducing the limit by a source that is specified in the statute and is included in the reducing clause itself. Accordingly, we agree with the circuit court that the provisions of the reducing clause on which Rural relied did comply with § 632.32(5)(i).
B. Contextual Ambiguity
Ruenger contends that, even if the reducing clause itself does comply with the statute, it is ambiguous when considered in the context of the entire policy and therefore is unenforceable. We disagree.
We first observe, that, for the reasons we have already explained in paragraph 18, any ambiguity in the reducing clause itself is not material to the facts of this case and would not cause a reasonable insured to believe that the limits stated in the declarations would not be reduced by a payment made by or on behalf of the tortfeasor. See Remiszewski, 276 Wis. 2d 167, . We next consider the clause in the context of other policy provisions that, according to Ruenger, render the clause ambiguous.
The "Personal Auto Policy Declarations" is at the beginning of the policy and consists of two pages. The declarations are generally the portion of the insurance policy to which the insured looks first. Badger Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schmitz, 2002 WI 98, , 255 Wis. 2d 61, 647 N.W.2d 223. The first page here contains information relevant to the entire policy, such as the policy period, effective date, driver information, additional insureds, and covered autos. The second page lists the limits for the various coverages provided by the policy. It clearly informs the insured that the insured is purchasing UIM coverage in a fixed amount--$300,000 each person and $300,000 each accident--and that these limits "shall be reduced as a result of your receiving amounts from other sources because of your 'bodily injury.'" There is no inconsistency between the general reference to "other sources" of reduction in the declarations and the more specific itemization of those sources in the UIM endorsement. A reasonable insured would not be confused by this but would understand that the second declarations
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