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Superior Snubbing Services2/3/2005
I. Introduction
Superior Snubbing Services, Inc. ("Superior") appeals from the trial court's grant of a summary judgment in favor of Energy Service Company of Bowie, Inc. ("Energy"). We will reverse and remand.
II. Factual Background
On December 12, 1996, Mitchell Energy Corporation ("Mitchell") entered into a Master Service Agreement contract with Superior for certain work to be performed by Superior for Mitchell. Paragraph seven of the contract states that the "contractor," Superior, will indemnify the "company," Mitchell, and its contractors, which include Energy, for claims of injury to Superior's employees in connection with the work to be performed under the contract. On March 8, 2000, one of Superior's employees, Daryll Faulk ("Faulk"), sustained an injury in the course of his employment while performing services under the contract. Superior was a subscriber under the Workers' Compensation Act at the time of the injury. Subsequently, Faulk sued Energy and others for his injuries, resulting in a settlement between Faulk, Energy, and Mitchell. Energy and Mitchell then filed suit against Superior seeking indemnity under the contract for the amount of the defense of the suit and the settlement of Faulk's claims. In answering the suit, Superior asserted that Energy's claims were barred by the exclusive remedy provisions of the Texas Labor Code and that the contract was unenforceable under the Texas Oilfield Anti-Indemnity Act. The trial court granted summary judgment for Energy against Superior on the contractual indemnity issue and rendered a judgment that was severed from the Mitchell suit, resulting in this appeal.
In two issues, Superior complains that the trial court erred in granting Energy summary judgment because (1) Energy's indemnity claims are barred under the exclusive remedy provisions of section 417.004 of the Texas Labor Code and (2) the contract is unenforceable under the Texas Oilfield Anti-Indemnity Act.
III. Law and Application to Facts
A. Statutory Construction
Section 417.004 of the Texas Labor Code provides,
In an action for damages brought by an injured employee . . . against a third party liable to pay damages for the injury . . . under this chapter that results in a . . . settlement by the third party, the employer is not liable to the third party for reimbursement or damages based on the . . . settlement unless the employer executed, before the injury or death occurred, a written agreement with the third party to assume the liability.
Tex. Lab. Code Ann. ยง 417.004 (emphasis supplied).
In its first point, Superior argues that it did not execute a "written agreement with the third party [Energy] to assume the liability." Rather, Superior contends it entered into a contract with Mitchell, and therefore Energy cannot claim indemnity against Superior due to the prohibition contained in section 417.004 of the labor code. While it is undisputed there is no written contract between Superior and Energy, Energy responds that because it is a third party beneficiary under the contract between Superior and Mitchell, it is entitled to step into the shoes of Mitchell and enforce the contract, thereby transforming the agreement into a "written agreement with the third party [Energy] to assume the liability."
There is no spotted dog or white horse case on point interpreting the specific language of section 417.004 regarding the meaning of "the third party."
B. Standard of Review
In reviewing a traditional motion for summary judgment, the reviewing court must resolve every doubt and indulge every reasonable inference
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