 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Employee Leasing Services in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Brown University v. Santos3/31/2005
al, basically alleges that there is no competent and probative medical evidence to support the employer's contention that the employee was capable of performing the suitable alternative employment position in August 2000 or November 2000. We strongly disagree. As we noted previously, the issue is whether the employee unjustifiably terminated the position on August 11, 2000. Dr. Graff testified that he examined the employee on April 28, 2000, a few days after he started working in the bookstore position. He stated that employment in that position would not be injurious to the employee's health. (Pet. Exh. #11, pp. 14-15.) The doctor further testified that his opinion regarding the employee's ability to do that job never changed thereafter. (Pet. Exh. #11, p. 16.) When Dr. Graff saw the employee on August 11, 2000, the day the employee stopped working, he found that the employee's physical examination was identical to his examination in April 2000 and in years before that.
The testimony of Dr. Graff is more than sufficient to establish that Mr. Santos was capable of performing the job requirements of the suitable alternative employment position on August 11, 2000, the relevant date for this petition. The doctor further stated that it was not injurious for the employee to perform those duties. There is no requirement for any additional medical evidence to support the petition.
The final five (5) reasons of appeal, numbers fourteen (14) through eighteen (18), state general allegations that the trial judge's decision thwarts the benevolent purposes of the Workers' Compensation Act and ignores that the employee did not speak English well and was perhaps unaware of his obligations under the Act. First, the employee erroneously argues that the Act is to be liberally construed in favor of the employee. A general principle of workers' compensation law is that because the act is social legislation, it should be construed liberally so as to achieve its benevolent purposes. We are unaware of any authority stating that the Act should be construed in favor of one party over another.
The employee alleges a lack of cooperation and communication on the part of the employer which the trial judge ignored. However, the trial judge specifically found that it was the employee who was not cooperative and did not communicate. The employee stopped working on August 11, 2000. Apparently, the functional capacity evaluation was ordered at that time. For whatever reason, it was not completed until October 23, 2000. Dr. Graff's office then contacted the employee to come in and see the doctor to discuss the results. That office visit took place on November 16, 2000. The employee never made any contact with the employer until after receiving a copy of the employer's petition to reduce his benefits and seeing his attorney on November 29, 2000. We believe the record supports the trial judge's conclusions regarding the lack of credibility and cooperation on the part of the employee. The contention that his decision thwarts the purpose and intention of the Act is unfounded.
Based upon the foregoing discussion, we deny and dismiss the employee's appeal and affirm the decision and decree of the trial judge. In accordance with Rule 2.20 of the Rules of Practice of the Workers' Compensation Court, a final decree, a copy of which is enclosed, shall be entered on
Healy, C.J., and Sowa, J. concur.
Healy, C.J.
Olsson, J.
Sowa, J.
FINAL DECREE OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This cause came on to be heard by the Appellate Division upon the appeal of the respondent/employee and upon consideration thereof, the appeal is denied and dismi
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 Rhode Island Employee Leasing Services
Employee Leasing Services
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Employee Leasing Services in your area.
|
|