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DeCamp v. Dollar Tree Stores6/14/2005
tion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56(c) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure. The motion justice granted the motion and dismissed both the sex discrimination and disability discrimination claims. The plaintiff appeals, claiming the motion justice erred with respect to each discrimination claim.
II. Analysis
This Court reviews the granting of summary judgment de novo and applies the same standards as the motion justice. Ritter v. Mantissa Investment Corp., 864 A.2d 601, 604 (R.I. 2005). Rule 56(c) provides that a motion for summary judgment should be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." We will review this evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Ritter, 864 A.2d at 604. That nonmoving party then must prove "'by competent evidence the existence of a disputed material issue of fact and cannot rest on allegations or denials in the pleadings or on conclusions or legal opinions.'" Id.
A. Employment Discrimination in Rhode Island The State Fair Employment
Practices Act (FEPA) prohibits an employer from either discharging an employee or discriminating against an employee with respect to "terms, conditions or privileges of employment" based on that employee's sex or disability. Section 28-5-7(1)(i),(ii). One of the ways the statute defines disability is "any physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more major life activities, has a record of an impairment, or is regarded as having an impairment by any * * * employer." Section 28-5-6(4).
The statute further defines " ajor life activities" as "functions such as caring for one's self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working." Section 28-5-6(4)(ii). FEPA further prohibits an employer from refusing "to reasonably accommodate an employee's or prospective employee's disability unless the employer can demonstrate that the accommodation would pose a hardship on the employer's program, enterprise, or business." Section 28-5-7(1)(iv).
The Civil Rights Act of 1990 (RICRA) similarly provides all persons with "full and equal benefit of all laws" regardless of sex or disability. Section 42-112-1(a). The terms sex and disability "have the same meaning as those terms are defined" in FEPA. Section 42-112-1(d). "A person whose rights under the provision of ยง 42-112-1 have been violated may commence a civil action for injunctive and other appropriate equitable relief, and for the award of compensatory and exemplary damages." Section 42-112-2.
B. Gender Discrimination-Two Distinct Theories of Recovery
Two distinct theories of gender-based employment discrimination arguably apply to this case: gender-based disparate treatment and gender-based hostile work environment. A gender-based disparate treatment claim follows the three-step burden-shifting legal framework first announced in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Casey v. Town of Portsmouth, 861 A.2d 1032, 1036-37 (R.I. 2004); Center for Behavioral Health, Rhode Island, Inc. v. Barros, 710 A.2d 680, 685 (R.I. 1998). A gender-based hostile work environment claim, in contrast, allows an employee to recover against his or her employer " hen the workplace is permeated with 'discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult,'" that is "'sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment.'" Harris v. Forklift Systems, I
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