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Trans-Vaughn Development Corp. v. Cummings6/2/2005
eneral rule, " ur cases have distinguished claims involving static defects from other slip and fall cases," where the so-called equal knowledge exception can apply to preclude recovery. Mechanical Equip. Co. v. Hoose, 241 Ga. App. 412, 413 (523 SE2d 575) (1999).
Notwithstanding [the Robinson] analysis, a claim involving a static defect differs from other [slip] and fall cases in that when a person has successfully negotiated an alleged dangerous condition on a previous occasion, that person is presumed to have [equal] knowledge of it and cannot recover for a subsequent injury resulting therefrom.
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) February v. Averitt Properties, Inc., 242 Ga. App. 137, 139 (528 SE2d 880) (2000). See also Gantt v. Dave & Buster's of Ga., Inc., 271 Ga. App. 457 (610 SE2d 116) (2005).
Cummings testified that she had negotiated the rear entrance previously on multiple occasions, including on at least one occasion with the infant carrier. Furthermore, Cummings concedes that she was aware that the stairs lacked handrails or a stairway landing, that the door handle was difficult to grab, and that the door lacked any device preventing it from quickly swinging open without tension. Accordingly, even assuming that the structure of the rear entranceway was defective, Cummings "had equal knowledge of the defects that allegedly caused her injuries," precluding her recovery for damages sustained in the slip and fall incident. Young v. Richards Homes, Inc., 271 Ga. App. 382 (609 SE2d 729) (2005).
We are not persuaded by Cummings' arguments to the contrary. She contends that summary judgment is inappropriate because there is a genuine issue of fact over whether the structure of the rear entrance violated applicable building codes. She further argues that there is a factual dispute over whether Trans-Vaughn had superior knowledge of the alleged defects based on its purported awareness of the code violations at the time of the remodeling in the early 1990s. However, because Cummings had knowledge of the defects in the rear entrance due to her repeated use of the entranceway, summary judgment is proper, irrespective of whether the rear entrance violated applicable building codes, and regardless of whether Trans-Vaughn knew of these violations beforehand but did nothing about them. See Wood v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 244 Ga. App. 187, 190 (534 SE2d 556) (2000) ("Wood claims the absence of slip-resistant paint on the ramp constituted a violation of ANSI standards and local ordinances. Even if such violations were proved and the defendants knew they existed, Wood cannot recover because she had equal knowledge of the alleged hazard."); February, 242 Ga. App. at 140.
Nor is our conclusion changed by Johnston v. Ross, 264 Ga. App. 252 (590 SE2d 386) (2003), Bastien v. Metro. Park Lake Assocs., L.P., 209 Ga. App. 881 (434 SE2d 736) (1993), and Watts v. Jaffs, 216 Ga. App. 565 (455 SE2d 328) (1995), which are relied upon by Cummings. Those cases involved the violation of housing codes by landlords of residential housing, not commercial property, and thus are distinguishable from the present case.
Cummings further contends that OCGA § 25-2-12 (c) applies in this case and evidences an important public policy adopted by the General Assembly in favor of strict compliance with fire safety codes in State- occupied buildings that should override the equal knowledge exception. However, OCGA § 25-2-12 (c) does not create a special set of more stringent minimum fire safety standards applicable only to facilities "owned and operated or occupied by the state." Rather, it simply provides that with respect to such facilities, the Office of the Safety Fire Comm
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