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Bell v. State1/10/2005
Deborah Austin was injured when her car was struck from behind by a van operated by Curtis Bell. Seeking to recover damages, Mrs. Austin and her husband (Appellees) filed a tort action against Bell (Appellant). Pursuant to OCGA § 24-3-18 (a), they gave timely pre-trial notice that they intended to introduce into evidence a narrative medical report made by one of Mrs. Austin's physicians. Also acting pursuant to OCGA § 24-3-18 (a), Appellant filed a timely challenge to the admissibility of the report on various grounds, including an attack on the constitutionality of the statute itself. The trial court overruled the objections, and admitted the report at trial. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Appellees. Appellant filed a notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals, which properly transferred the case to this Court on the ground that it is within our jurisdiction over appeals raising constitutional issues.
1. A constitutional question will not be decided unless it is essential to the resolution of the case. Bagwell v. Cash, 207 Ga. 222, 223 (4) (60 SE2d 628) (1950). Therefore, our initial focus is on the non-constitutional objections to admission of the record.
a) Appellant contends that OCGA § 24-3-18 permits the jury to hear medical testimony without sanction of the oath otherwise required by OCGA § 24-9-60.
" nsworn statements are not treated as amounting to any evidence, except 'in specified cases from necessity.' [Cits.]" Huiet v. Schwob Mfg. Co., 196 Ga. 855, 859 (2) (27 SE2d 743) (1943) (citing OCGA § 24-3-1, the hearsay statute). OCGA § 24-3-18 is such a "specified" exception to the hearsay rule. By its terms, the statute does not address a witness' oral testimony, but relates instead to "any medical report in narrative form which has been signed and dated by [certain enumerated] examining or treating [medical professionals] ...." OCGA § 24-3-18 (a). The statute is intended to create a hearsay exception applicable in "the trial of any civil case involving injury or disease," so that a medical report in narrative form authored by one of the designated professionals shall be admissible and received in evidence insofar as it purports to represent the history, examination, diagnosis, treatment, prognosis, or interpretation of tests or examinations, including the basis therefor, by the person signing the report, the same as if that person were present at trial and testifying as a witness.... OCGA § 24-3-18 (a). Thus, the very purpose of the statute is to dispense with the necessity of producing the author of the medical report as a sworn witness at trial, by authorizing the admission of the report itself. In doing so, it extends to civil cases involving injury or disease the same hearsay exception which has long been applicable in the workers' compensation context. See Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Crews, 139 Ga. App. 521, 522 (2) (229 SE2d 14) (1976). Because no oral testimony is implicated, the oath specified in OCGA § 24-9-60 is not mandated.
b) Appellant also contends that the statute denies him the right to conduct a cross-examination of the author of the report. To the contrary, however, OCGA § 24-3-18 (a) expressly provides that "any adverse party shall have the right to cross-examine the person signing the report and provide rebuttal testimony." Thus, the statute does not violate Appellant's right to confront and cross-examine witnesses. See Foster v. Aladdin Mills, 237 Ga. 704 (229 SE2d 451) (1976) (construing OCGA § 34-9-102 (e) (2), the comparable provision which authorizes admission of medical reports in workers' compensation cases).
c) Appellant next urges that the report was inadmissible because, even though it contained medical opini
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