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Collie Concessions3/30/2005
positional risk doctrine to Bruce's claim. The plurality opinion in Johnson was technically "physical precedent only" since less than a majority of the judges concurred fully. But the superior court's reliance on Johnson was not unreasonable as it reflected at that time the latest thinking on the subject by six judges of our court. However, after the superior court reached its decision, Johnson was expressly disapproved in Chaparral Boats v. Heath. Therefore, contrary to the superior court's ruling, Johnson does not support the application of the positional risk doctrine to the case at bar.
5. Based on our holdings above, we need not address Collie Concessions's remaining enumerations of error.
Judgment reversed. Blackburn, P. J., concurs specially and in judgment only. Barnes, J., concurs in judgment only.
Blackburn, Presiding Judge, concurring specially.
Because I cannot concur with all that is said in the majority opinion, I must concur in the judgment only.
The relevant facts in this case are straightforward. Lillie Bruce, an annual employee of Collie Concessions, Inc., drove to the Augusta National Golf Club to work at one of Collie's concession stands along the golf course. As instructed by Collie, Bruce parked in a lot which Collie did not own, lease, control, or maintain. While walking to the golf course, Bruce was struck by a car while crossing a public street. Bruce subsequently requested workers' compensation benefits for her injuries from Collie.
Under these facts, Bruce has not shown that she is entitled to workers' compensation because she was neither: (1) acting in furtherance of her duties on Collie's behalf at the time of her injuries nor (2) going to or from work to a parking lot which was owned or maintained by Collie.
1. "Generally, an injury is compensable only if it arises out of and in the course of the employment. The test presents two independent and distinct criteria, and an injury is not compensable unless it satisfies both." (Footnotes omitted.) Mayor and Aldermen of the City of Atlanta v. Stevens. Also, as a general matter, the "rule in this state is accidents that occur while employees are traveling to and from work do not arise out of and in the course of employment and thus are not compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act." Hill v. Omni Hotel at CNN Center.
In this case, it is undisputed that Bruce was simply going to work at the time that she was injured, not acting in the course of her employment. Therefore, in the absence of some applicable exception to the general rules cited above, Bruce is not entitled to workers' compensation benefits. Id.
2. Bruce maintains that the "parking lot exception" entitles her to workers' compensation benefits. This contention is wholly misplaced.
The parking lot exception provides that when an employee is injured in, or going to and from, a parking lot which is owned or maintained by the employer, the incident is compensable under workers' compensation since the injury arose during the employee's ingress or egress from employment. The rationale which has allowed compensation for injuries which occur in, or going to or coming from, parking lots which are owned, maintained or controlled by the employer does not extend so far as to allow coverage when workers' compensation benefits are claimed for an injury which occurred in a public parking lot which was neither owned, controlled, nor maintained by the employer. Where the parking lot is neither owned, controlled, nor maintained by the employer, the lot is not part of the employer's premises and the rationale which allows recovery of workers' compensation benefit
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