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Collie Concessions3/30/2005
building of which it occupies only a part, and two ways through the building are the only means of ingress and egress to an from such place of business, both ways are parts of the employer's premises within the meaning of the workmen's compensation law." The court's reliance on De Howitt was undoubtedly based on the fact that Bruce was required to enter Augusta National through Gate 7 on Berckman Road. The court may have reasoned that the temporary crosswalk leading to Gate 7 was analogous to the ingress to the building found to be part of the employer's premises in De Howitt. To its detriment, the superior court did not have the benefit of our recent decision in Omni Hotel. That case explained that the general rule in Georgia is that
accidents that occur while employees are traveling to and from work do not arise out of and in the course of employment and thus are not compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act. But under the "ingress and egress" rule, where an employee is injured while still on the employer's premises in the act of going to or coming from his or her workplace, the Act does apply.
As noted above, we held in Omni Hotel that the area where the employee was injured, the food court/mall area, was not a part of her employer's premises because it was not owned, controlled, or maintained by the employer. Omni Hotel distinguished De Howitt on the basis that the record clearly showed that a third party, Turner Properties, owned, controlled, and maintained the premises at issue. In the case at bar, neither Collie Concessions nor Augusta National owned, maintained or controlled the street or the crosswalk. The Board found that the temporary crosswalk was constructed by Augusta-Richmond County for special use by the tournament. Therefore, the crosswalk was not part of Bruce's employer's premises, and her injury is not compensable.
4. In awarding benefits to Bruce, the superior court also relied on the positional risk doctrine. The positional risk doctrine exists in some circumstances to satisfy the requirement that an injury arise out of a claimant's employment. It can apply when the cause of the injury had nothing to do with the claimant's usual duties. For example, in the leading case employing the positional risk doctrine, National Fire Ins. Co. v. Edwards, the claimant was on his employer's premises when a tornado damaged the premises and injured the employees. Under case law prior to Edwards, the injury would not have been compensable because, although it clearly occurred in the course of his employment, it did not arise out of his employment.
The claimant in Edwards was on the premises of the employer and was in the course of his employment when injured. As discussed in Division 3, Bruce was not on her employer's premises when she was in the crosswalk. And she was not in the course of her employment, but rather was on her way to work. Therefore, Edwards does not support her claim. A variant of the positional risk doctrine appears in the traveling salesman cases such as New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Sumrell and Thornton v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. But the traveling salesman cases have not been extended to allow recovery for other types of employees who are injured off the premises while going to and from work. We decline to extend the positional risk doctrine to make compensable an injury which occurs while an employee is going to or from work, unless the injury occurs on the premises or within the parking lot exception, even when, as in the case at bar, the employer designates a particular time to come to work and a particular route or portal to use.
The superior court relied on Johnson v. Publix Supermarkets in order to apply the
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