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Cooper v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado2/24/2005
ORDER AFFIRMED IN PART, SET ASIDE IN PART
Webb and Hume, JJ., concur
In this workers' compensation proceeding, Sylvia Cooper, in her capacity as personal representative for the Estate of Maxine Cooper (Estate), seeks review of the final order of the Industrial Claim Appeals Office (Panel) denying permanent partial disability (PPD) benefits and granting the request of Safeway, Inc. (respondent) for reimbursement of an overpayment. We affirm in part and set aside in part.
Maxine Cooper (decedent) sustained an admitted industrial injury in March 2002. Respondent filed an uncontested final admission of liability on August 30, 2002, accepting liability for PPD benefits in the amount of $26,831.54. Respondent made a periodic PPD payment of $1,064.70 by check on September 4, 2002, and then made a lump sum payment of $9,981.05 by check on September 12, 2002.
Decedent died on September 14, 2002, of causes unrelated to her industrial injury. Shortly after decedent's death, the Estate negotiated both checks and requested an order requiring payment of the balance of the PPD award. At the hearing, the Estate conceded that decedent left no dependents as defined by the Workers' Compensation Act (Act).
The administrative law judge (ALJ) determined that the Act does not provide for the payment of PPD benefits to the legal representative of an injured worker's estate. Accordingly, the ALJ denied the Estate's claim for the remainder of the PPD award.
On review, the Panel upheld the ALJ's denial of the Estate's claim for the remaining PPD benefits. However, it further determined that the ALJ had erred in failing to order repayment of a portion of the previously paid PPD lump sum payment and modified the order to allow respondent to recover an overpayment of $9,675.85.
I.
The Estate first contends that the ALJ erred in determining that it was not entitled to decedent's awarded medical impairment benefits. We disagree.
Because decedent's death did not occur as a result of the industrial injury, the Estate's claim is governed by § 8-42-116(1), C.R.S. 2004, which states in pertinent part:
If death occurs to an injured employee, other than as a proximate result of any injury, before disability indemnity ceases and the deceased leaves persons wholly dependent upon the deceased for support, death benefits shall be as follows:
(b) Where the injury proximately caused permanent partial disability, the death benefit shall consist of the unpaid and unaccrued portion of the permanent partial disability benefit which the employee would have received had he lived.
(Emphasis added.)
The purpose of § 8-42-116(1) is to provide dependents of deceased workers with a substitute for the support previously provided by the decedent through the receipt of disability benefits. However, under the "rule of independence," disability payments awarded to an injured worker are entirely independent from death benefits awarded to the employee's dependents. Metro Glass & Glazing, Inc. v. Orona, 868 P.2d 1178, 1180 (Colo. App. 1994). Further, the survival statute, which allows all causes of action to be brought notwithstanding the death of the person in favor of whom the action originally accrued, is inapplicable to claims filed under the Act. Dick v. Indus. Comm'n, 197 Colo. 71, 73, 589 P.2d 950, 951 (1979), overruled in part on other grounds by Estate of Huey v. J.C. Trucking, Inc., 837 P.2d 1218, 1220 (Colo. 1992).
Thus, we agree with the Panel's conclusion that decedent's entitlement to PPD benefits does not entitle the Estate to death benefits, except as specifically
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