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Wolford v. Pinnacol Assurance2/28/2005
e were to apply section 8-43-402 to forfeit all workers' compensation benefits, including those not obtained through fraud or false statements, we would render the criminal conviction portion of section 8-43-304(2) meaningless and contravene the intent of the General Assembly.
Section 8-43-304(2) does not stand alone as the only evidence of the General Assembly's understanding that section 8-43-402 requires less than a complete forfeiture of all a claimant's compensation under the Act. Section 8-42-112(1)(d), enacted in 1999, requires workers' compensation provided under the Act be reduced by fifty percent if a claimant willfully misled his employer concerning his physical ability to perform the job and was subsequently injured as a result. Ch. 139, sec. 1, ยง 8-42-112(1)(d), 1999 Colo. Sess. Laws 406, 406. This fifty-percent penalty is to apply "in addition to any other penalty that may be imposed under section 8-43-402." Again, by the express language used, section 8-42-112(1)(d) overlaps with section 8-43-402. Given this overlap, it is evident that the General Assembly contemplates some amount of compensation remaining due to a claimant after the application of the forfeiture provision in section 8-43-402.
In the situation where the claimant's misleading or false statements about her physical ability to perform the job also resulted in a conviction under 8-43-402, section 8-42-112(1)(d) assumes that the fifty-percent penalty would apply in addition to the forfeiture provision of 8-43-402. If we were to interpret section 8-43-402 to render a complete forfeiture as urged by Pinnacol, there would be no possibility of any compensation being due a claimant and our interpretation would therefore contravene the General Assembly's comprehension of the statute and render the reference to section 8-43-402 in section 8-42-112(1)(d) superfluous.
Given the significant overlap with other sections of the Act, it is apparent that the broad interpretation of section 8-43-402 as urged by Pinnacol and adopted by the court of appeals would be antagonistic to these provisions. More specifically, a complete forfeiture of all compensation under the Act would conflict with the application of sections 8-43-304(2) and 8-42-112(1)(d). As a result, we cannot adopt such an interpretation.
Having determined that section 8-43-402 cannot be applied so broadly as to render a forfeiture of all compensation, we must determine how to apply the provision. We look to a narrower construction of section 8-43-402 that best reflects the remedial purpose of the Act and incorporates the intent of the General Assembly. We must also construe the provision so that it is in harmony with the rest of the Act. See Gonzales, 949 P.2d at 574. We conclude that the forfeiture provision is best read as only a forfeiture of compensation obtained as a result of the false statements. That is, there must be a nexus between the false statements and the compensation forfeited.
First, we are persuaded that a narrow construction of section 8-43-402 serves the "remedial and beneficent" purpose underlying Colorado's workers' compensation system. See Davison, 84 P.3d at 1029. Requiring a nexus between the false statements and the compensation forfeited gives a claimant a remedy for those injuries suffered on the job and permits compensation where the claimant is entitled to such benefits. The nexus requirement avoids the loss of benefits for which an insurer or self-insured employer concedes liability simply because of false statements unrelated to a claimant's right to redress for her injuries. The General Assembly specifically instructs that the Act is to "be interpreted so as to assure the quick and efficient delivery
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