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Catalina Yachts v. Pierce1/14/2005
tions; it simply limits Rule 82's possible reach to named parties, meaning that a [defendant] who has been forced to litigate in order to secure his or her rights will be reimbursed in part for litigation expenses." Thus, the dissent's pronounced reliance on Turner to resolve the question in this case is misplaced.
Rule 68 therefore applies in this case. The superior court calculated the amount of the Pierces' judgment following the first trial, first for the purpose of comparing it to Catalina's offer and then under Rule 68 in order to determine the final amount they were owed. At the second trial, the jury awarded no new damages, so its basic award was not increased. And because the Pierces were thus not prevailing parties, they can get no further fees or costs under Magnuson-Moss. Assuming that the superior court's calculations were correct at the outset, Catalina's offer is still larger than the Pierces' award and the superior court's calculation of the value of the Pierces' award under the Rule 68 formula remains accurate. The superior court must still determine the fees and costs incurred by Catalina since the original calculation following the first trial and then recalculate the offset between the parties' awards.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the superior court's decision not to apply Alaska Civil Rule 68 and the judgment that followed, and REMAND for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
BRYNER, Justice, dissenting.
I disagree with this opinion and would affirm the superior court's ruling on fees. I would reach this conclusion under our own civil rules, without deciding the issue of federal preemption.
As I read them, Civil Rules 68 and 82 would not support an award of fees to Catalina. Civil Rule 68 expressly required Catalina's post-offer fees to be determined by looking to the fees that Catalina would have recovered under Rule 82 if it had prevailed in this action: " f the offeree is the party making the claim, . . . the offeree must pay the costs and attorney's fees incurred after the making of the offer (as would be calculated under Civil Rules 79 and 82 if the offeror were the prevailing party)." If Catalina had prevailed against the Pierces, Rule 82 would have precluded it from recovering any prevailing-party fees. Specifically, Rule 82(a) provides: "Except as otherwise provided by law or agreed to by the parties, the prevailing party in a civil case shall be awarded attorney's fees calculated under this rule." Here, the issue of prevailing-party fees is in fact "otherwise provided by law": the Magnuson-Moss Act does not permit fee awards to prevailing defendants, expressly providing for awards only to a prevailing "consumer." Since Rule 82(a) gives controlling effect to the Magnuson-Moss Act's fee provision and Rule 68 expressly limits post-offer fees to those that "would be calculated under Civil Rule . . . 82 if the offeror were the prevailing party," Catalina has no right to recover post-offer fees under Rule 68.
Today's opinion reaches the contrary conclusion by reading Rule 68(b)(1) as if it referred only to the mechanical process of calculating the amount of fees, as set out in Rule 82(b). But this interpretation is textually implausible. If Rule 68(b)(1) had simply been intended to direct how the amount of the offeror's award should be determined, then it could easily have pointed specifically to Civil Rule 82(b), which expressly deals with the "Amount of Award " made under that rule. Instead Rule 68(b)(1) was phrased broadly to require that fees be calculated under "Rule 82." This broad reference to Rule 82 in its entirety encompasses subsection 82(a). By referring to fees "
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