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Perritt v. State9/23/2005
to (4) his property to the wrongdoer, (5) who (a) knows his representation to be false and (b) intends to defraud the victim. 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 19.7 at 114-115 (2nd ed. 2003).
[ ] We have articulated our views on the elements of this crime in various ways over the years. For instance, in Martins v. State, 17 Wyo. 319, 98 P. 709, 712-13 (1908) we said:
There can be no question upon the face of this statute that the property so obtained, in order to constitute the offense, must be obtained from the owner by means of false pretenses. There can be no party defrauded within the purview of this statute except the owner or one having a special ownership in, and who is induced by false pretenses to part with, his property. The fraud contemplated is the fraud which is perpetrated against the owner of the property. In this respect our statute is different from that of some states, where intent alone is sufficient, regardless of whether it be to defraud any specific person (19 Cyc. 415), or when the attempt to obtain goods by false pretenses is made a distinct felony. Having no statute making it a crime to attempt to obtain goods by false pretenses, decisions under such a statute are inapplicable to the case before us. Under the statute the intent to defraud the person from whom the property is obtained by means of false pretenses is an essential element of the crime. In the absence of such intent the crime is not complete, and even if such intent be present the crime is still not complete unless the party from whom the goods were so obtained was actually defrauded. 19 Cyc. 411, and cases there cited. Naked possession by an agent of his principal's property does not vest title of ownership in such agent. It is said subdivision "d," at page 408 of 19 Cyc.: "To constitute an obtaining of property, defendant must in the first place acquire at least a voidable title to the property; that is, the owner must intend to invest him with the title, as distinguished from the mere custody or possession of the goods." This text is fully supported by citations in the footnotes. Under a similar statute the Supreme Court of Wisconsin said: "The crime is defined in section 4423, St. 1898, and consists in obtaining the money or property of another by false pretenses. It must be obtained from the owner by false pretenses." Owens v. State, 83 Wis. 496, 53 N. W. 736; section 472, 2 Bishop's New Criminal Law. The crime is statutory, and the information should set forth all the requisites of the statute to constitute it. The ownership should by the averments of the information be correctly stated. Bishop's New Criminal Proc. § 173; Wharton's Criminal Law (8th Ed.) §§ 1211, 1223, 932, 977; Wharton's Criminal Ev. § 94; 19 Cyc. 425, 426, 434, and cases cited; Leobold v. State, 33 Ind. 484; Halley v. State, 43 Ind. 509; State v. Miller, 153 Ind. 229, 54 N. E. 808; State v. Lathrop, 15 Vt. 279; Washington v. State, 41 Tex. 583.
In the case before us the information charges that the money was obtained from Julius Mayer, and while the ownership is not laid in any one else-nor is it directly laid in Mayer for that matter-yet the inference is that it was his money. Without discussing the sufficiency of the information in this respect, as that question has not been here presented, but conceding for the purpose of this case alone that it is sufficient, we pass to a consideration of the evidence to see if it be sufficient to support a verdict, and whether or not the verdict is contrary to the evidence.
From the evidence it appears that the money obtained from Mayer was not his money, but was the money of one Robert Freedman, by whom Mayer was employed, and that Mayer had authority to rece
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