Hessenthaler v. Tri-County Sister Help7/18/2005
nt page of the handbook, in bold, capitalized letters, we hold that the disclaimer is conspicuous as a matter of law. Marr, 307 S.C. at 547, 416 S.E.2d at 616; Johnson, 305 S.C. at 560, 409 S.E.2d at 806.
Finding the disclaimer to be conspicuous as a matter of law, we next turn to the question of whether the handbook contains a promise. Hessenthaler contends that the nondiscrimination provision constituted a promise, and that she was fired in violation of that promise. The provision provides:
[The Shelter] is an equal opportunity employer. All decisions, including hiring, training, and promotion, are made without regard to race, color, religion, national origin, sex, age, handicap, sexual preference, or any other protected status.
We hold that this provision does not constitute a promise altering the at-will employment relationship and giving rise to a breach-of-contract claim. See McKenzie v. Lunds, Inc., 63 F. Supp. 2d 986, 1003 (D. Minn. 1999) (holding that nondiscrimination policy statements in employee handbook are legally insufficient to sustain a breach-of-contract claim; such policies are too indefinite to form a contract between employer and employee); Cherella v. Phoenix Technologies Ltd., 586 N.E.2d 29, 31 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992) (holding that an equal opportunity policy announced in an employee handbook did not establish contractual rights supporting a breach-of-contract claim). Unlike a mandatory, progressive discipline procedure, a general policy statement of nondiscrimination does not create an expectation that employment is guaranteed for any specific duration or that a particular process must be followed before an employee may be fired.
To be enforceable in contract, general policy statements must be definitive in nature, promising specific treatment in specific situations. See, e.g., Ex parte Amoco Fabrics & Fiber Co., 729 So.2d 336, 339 (Ala. 1998) (" become a binding promise, the language used in the handbook . . . must be specific enough to constitute an actual offer rather than a mere general statement of policy") (internal quotations omitted); Ross v. Times Mirror, Inc., 665 A.2d 580, 584 (Vt. 1995) (" nly those policies which are definitive in form, communicated to the employees, and demonstrate an objective manifestation of the employer's intent to bind itself will be enforced"); cf. Bookman v. Shakespeare Co., 314 S.C. 146, 148-49, 442 S.E.2d 183, 184 (Ct. App. 1994) (finding that a sexual harassment policy contained a promise to "promptly and carefully" investigate complaints of sexual harassment). The nondiscrimination provision in this case was not specific and did not make any promises regarding disciplinary procedure or termination decisions. Therefore, we hold that the handbook did not contain promises enforceable in contract.
Accordingly, we conclude that the evidence in this case leads to only one inference: the handbook does not constitute a contract. Therefore, the issue of whether the handbook constituted a contract should not have been submitted to the jury. See Small, 292 S.C. at 483, 357 S.E.2d at 454 (holding that the issue of whether a contract exists should be submitted to the jury when the existence of the contract is in question and the evidence is either conflicting or admits of more than one inference).
Conclusion
Because the Shelter's handbook contained a conspicuous disclaimer, of which Hessenthaler had actual notice, and because the handbook did not contain any promissory language altering the employment at-will relationship, we hold that the handbook did not constitute a contract. Therefore, the Shelter's post-trial motions should have been granted.
Accordingl
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