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Thompson v. Carlson12/14/2005
g Bernuth, 770 A.2d at 401).
The Preliminary Issue of Standing
The first issue that this Court must address is standing. The Applicant asserts that none of the Appellants has standing to challenge the Zoning Board's decision. Specifically, the Applicant maintains that the Appellants have failed to show that they were entitled to notice or that they were aggrieved parties within the meaning of G.L. 1956 § 45-24-31(4). This Court disagrees.
It has previously been held that " party acquires standing either by suffering an injury in fact or as the beneficiary of express statutory authority granting standing. Tanner v. Town Council of Town of East Greenwich, 880 A.2d 784, 792 (R.I. 2005); see also Cortellesso v. Town of Smithfield Zoning Board of Review, No.2005-21-A., slip op. at 10 (R.I., filed Nov. 10, 2005) (holding that an "appeal must be taken by an aggrieved person who has an actual stake in the outcome of the controversy"). In cases that involve statutory standing, "the analysis consists of a straight statutory construction of the relevant statute to determine upon whom the Legislature conferred standing and whether the claimant in question falls in that category." Id. at 793 n.6. Section 45-24-63 provides that "an appeal from any decision of an administrative officer or agency . . . may be taken to the zoning board of review by an aggrieved party." An aggrieved party is defined as
"(i) Any person or persons or entity or entities who can demonstrate that their property will be injured by a decision of any officer or agency responsible for administering the zoning ordinance of a city or town; or
(ii) Anyone requiring notice pursuant to this chapter."
Sec. 45-24-31(4). Section 45-24-53(c)(2) requires that written notice be given "to all owners of real property whose property is located in or within not less than two hundred feet (200') of the perimeter of the area proposed for change . . . ."
The Applicant asserts that there is no evidence that any of the appellants own property within two hundred feet of the Hot Club, and that they have not demonstrated that they are aggrieved parties within the meaning of the statute. This assertion ignores the fact that Corliss Landing is located within two hundred feet of the Hot Club and that each owner in that development was entitled to notice.
The organization and operation of Corliss Landing Condominium is governed by chapter 36.1 of title 34, the Condominium Act. Pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 34-36.1-3.01, every condominium development is required to organize a unit owners' association "no later than the date the first unit in the condominium is conveyed to a purchaser." The statute further mandates that " he membership of the association at all times shall consist exclusively of all the unit owners . . . ." Sec. 34-36.1-3.01.
The Condominium Act confers onto each unit owners' association certain enumerated powers, including the power to " nstitute, defend, or intervene in litigation or administrative proceedings in its own name on behalf of itself or two (2) or more unit owners on matters affecting the condominium[.]" Sec. 34-36.1-3.02(a)(4). It is undisputed that each individual condominium owner at Corliss Landing was entitled to notice of the Applicant's request for a zoning change because the development is located within the requisite statutory "perimeter of the area proposed for change . . . ." Sec. 45-24-53(c)(2). As the unit owners were entitled to notice and the Legislature expressly conferred upon condominium unit owners' associations the right to intervene in administrative proceedings, the Corliss Landing Owners' Association possesses standing to
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