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Thompson v. Carlson12/14/2005
earing duly was conducted and, on May 5, 2004, the Zoning Board adopted a Resolution (Decision) approving the application. The Decision was recorded on May 7, 2004, and the Appellants timely appealed the decision to this Court.
Standard of Review
The Superior Court's review of a zoning board decision is governed by § 45-24-69(d). Section § 45-24-69(d) provides:
"The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the zoning board of review as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. The court may affirm the decision of the board of review or remand the case for further proceedings, or may reverse or modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because of findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions which are:
(1) In violation of constitutional, statutory, ordinance or planning board regulations provisions;
(2) In excess of the authority granted to the zoning board of review by statute or ordinance;
(3) Made upon unlawful procedure;
(4) Affected by other error of law;
(5) Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence of the whole record; or
(6) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion."
When reviewing a decision of a zoning board, the trial justice "must examine the entire record to determine whether 'substantial' evidence exists to support the board's findings." DeStefano v. Zoning Board of Review of Warwick, 122 R.I. 241, 245, 405 A.2d 1167, 1170 (1979). The term "substantial evidence" has been defined as "such relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, and means amount more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance." Lischio v. Zoning Bd. of Review of North Kingstown, 818 A.2d 685, 690 n.5 (R.I. 2003) (quoting Caswell v. George Sherman Sand & Gravel Co., Inc., 424 A.2d 646, 647 (R.I. 1981)). In conducting its review, the trial justice "may 'not substitute its judgment for that of the zoning board of review as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact.'" Curran v. Church Community Housing Corp., 672 A.2d 453, 454 (R.I. 1996) (quoting G.L. 1956 § 45-24-69(d)). Thus, although the trial justice has "the authority to remand a case to the zoning board of review for further proceedings[,]" such remand "should be based upon a genuine defect in the proceedings in the first instance . . . or upon the fact that there is no record of the proceedings upon which a reviewing court may act." Roger Williams College v. Gallison, 572 A.2d 61, 62-63 (R.I. 1990).
The deferential standard of review that must be accorded a zoning board's decision "is contingent upon sufficient findings of fact by the zoning board." Kaveny v. Town of Cumberland Zoning Bd. of Review, 875 A.2d 1, 7 (R.I. 2005). That is because, "a municipal board, when acting in a quasi-judicial capacity, must set forth in its decision findings of fact and reasons for the actions taken . . . so that zoning board decisions may be susceptible of judicial review." Id. (Internal citations and quotation marks excluded.) Furthermore, the finding of a zoning board must "be factual rather than conclusional, and the application of the legal principles must be something more than the recital of a litany." Id. (quoting Bernuth v. Zoning Board of Review of New Shoreham, 770 A.2d 396, 401 (R.I. 2001). In cases where a zoning board "fails to state findings of fact, the [trial justice] will not search the record for supporting evidence or decide for itself what is proper in the circumstances." Kaveny, 875 A.2d at 7 (quotin
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