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American Legion Post 12 v. Susa11/30/2005
re clearly within its discretion.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court's review of a decision of the Commission is governed by G.L. 1956 § 42-35-15(g), which provides as follows:
(g) The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. The court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case for further proceedings, or it may reverse or modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:
(1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
(2) In excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
(3) Made upon unlawful procedure;
(4) Affected by other error of law;
(5) Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record; or
(6) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.
In reviewing an agency decision, this Court is limited to an examination of the certified record in deciding whether the agency's decision is supported by substantial evidence. Ctr. for Behavioral Health, Rhode Island, Inc. v. Barros, 710 A.2d 680, 684 (R.I. 1998) (citations omitted). "Substantial evidence has been defined as 'such relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, and means an amount more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance.'" Id. (quoting Newport Shipyard, Inc. v. Rhode Island Commission for Human Rights, 673 A.2d 457, 459 (R.I. 1996)). This Court may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency board on issues of fact or with regard to the credibility of witnesses where substantial evidence exists to support the agency's findings. See Mercantum Farm Corp. v. Dutra, 572 A.2d 286, 288 (R.I. 1990); Barros, 710 A.2d at 684; Baker v. Dep't of Employment and Training Bd. of Review, 637 A.2d 360, 366 (R.I. 1994). As a result, the findings of fact of an agency "are, in the absence of fraud, conclusive upon this court if in the record there is any competent legal evidence from which those findings could properly be made." Mercantum Farm Corp., 572 A.2d at 288 (quoting Leviton Mfg. Co. v. Lillibridge, 120 R.I. 283, 287, 387 A.2d 1034, 1036-37 (1978)).
ANALYSIS
A. Hostile Work Environment Harassment
Under the Rhode Island Fair Employment Practices Act ("FEPA"), an employer is prohibited from discriminating against an employee with respect to the "terms, conditions or privileges of employment" based on that employee's sex or country of ancestral origin. See § 28-5-7(1)(ii). In considering claims brought under § 28-5-7, the Rhode Island Supreme Court has looked to decisions of the federal courts, in construing Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, for guidance. See DeCamp v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., 875 A.2d 13, 21 (R.I. 2005); see also Newport Shipyard, Inc., 484 A.2d at 897-98; Narragansett Electric Co. v. Rhode Island Commission for Human Rights, 118 R.I. 457, 374 A.2d 1022 (1977).
In the case at hand, the Commission analyzed the complainants' allegations of sexual and ancestral origin harassment under the so called "hostile work environment" framework. (Decision at 13, 16.) When one undertakes such an inquiry, the existence of harassment is "determined in light of 'the record as a whole' and with regard to 'the totality of the circumstances.'" DeCamp, 875 A.2d at 22 (citing Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 69 (1986)). In addition, a six-part test is to be applied to determine
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