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Weaver v. Harpster10/21/2005
1 This is an appeal from an order sustaining Appellees' preliminary objections and dismissing Appellants' complaint in an action based on allegations of sexual harassment. Appellant Malissa Weaver presents the question of whether Pennsylvania recognizes a common law cause of action for wrongful discharge of an at-will employee based on allegations of sexual harassment where the defendant employer does not meet the definitional standards of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (PHRA), 43 P.S. ยง 953(b).
2 In August of 2001, Appellant was hired as an administrative assistant and office manager by Appellees. During the year of her employment, she was allegedly subjected to continual sexual harassment by Appellee Walter Harpster to the point that she resigned in July of 2002 because of the intolerable conditions, and Appellees' failure to take appropriate remedial action. Her subsequent request that the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission (PHRC) investigate her allegations of discrimination was denied on the basis that no remedy was available to her under the Act because Appellees, having less than four employees, did not meet the statutory definition of "employer."
3 Following the PHRC's rejection of her claim, Appellant commenced an action in common pleas court alleging sexual harassment, discrimination and harassment in violation of the PHRA, constructive discharge in violation of the PHRA, wrongful discharge, assault and battery, invasion of privacy, and loss of consortium. Appellees' preliminary objections were sustained by the trial court which also entered an order on June 28, 2004, dismissing counts 1 through 5, and leaving only the assault and battery claim to proceed to trial. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Appellee Harpster. This appeal followed, in which Appellant requests reversal of two counts of her amended complaint dismissed in the trial court's June 28, 2004, Order: count III, regarding discrimination and harassment, and count IV, regarding constructive discharge.
4 Appellant urges us to find a public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine, since it would be both arbitrary and against public policy to foreclose all avenues of relief for victims of sexual harassment; after having exhausted administrative remedies in approaching the PHRC, she was precluded from relief under the statute only because Appellees employ less than four people, not because her claim was inherently deficient.
5 Our Supreme Court has opined that
reliminary objections should be sustained only in cases that are clear and free from doubt. In ruling on whether preliminary objections were properly sustained, an appellate court must determine whether it is clear from all the facts pleaded that the pleader will be unable to prove facts legally sufficient to establish a right to relief. There must exist a degree of certainty that the law will not provide relief based on the facts averred.
Uniontown Newspapers, Inc. v. Roberts, 839 A.2d 185, 196 (Pa. 2003) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
6 The trial court, in sustaining Appellees' preliminary objections, relied on Clay v. Advanced Computer Applications, 559 A.2d 917 (Pa. 1989), for the proposition that the PHRA is the exclusive remedy for any type of employment discrimination based on sex. Therefore, the court reasoned that since the PHRA provides no remedy for Appellant, she has none.
7 Clay, however, is not only distinguishable, but also provides otherwise than the trial court found. First, the issue before the Clay Court concerned an at-will employee who sought to bring a legal action for wrongful termination based on se
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