 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Employee Leasing Services in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Wallace v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board9/12/2005
.S. § 732; (2) submitting a final receipt signed by the claimant pursuant to Section 434 of the Act, 77 P.S. § 1001; (3) obtaining an interlocutory order from a WCJ granting a discretionary supersedeas pursuant to Sections 413(a.1) and 413(a.2) of the Act, 77 P.S. §774; (4) filing a petition to suspend compensation pursuant to Section 413(c) of the Act, 77 P.S. § 774.2, with an accompanying affidavit attesting that the claimant has returned to work at wages greater than or equal to his pre-injury wage; or (5) obtaining a final order from a WCJ terminating the claimant's benefits. Sheridan v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board (Anzon, Inc.), 713 A.2d 182 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998).
With regard to the 1994 work injury and 1995 supplemental agreement thereto, we find that the Board's order should have required Employer to resume the payment of benefits for that injury. In Sheridan, the employer unilaterally ceased paying the claimant's benefits after his return to work in a light-duty position with no loss in earnings. The employer, not unlike Employer here, failed to obtain an agreement, supplemental agreement, final order, supersedeas or any other order allowing it to suspend payment. The claimant was later terminated from employment, and thereafter filed a petition alleging that the employer illegally discontinued payment of benefits. We reversed the Board's order insofar as it relieved the employer of its obligation to pay the claimant benefits, stating that "absent an order from a orkers' compensation authority or from a court or an agreement of the parties or the filing of a petition which acts as an automatic supersedeas, an employer's obligation to pay out benefits continues." Id. at 185. We then ordered the payment of the claimant's workers' compensation benefits from the date of his termination until the date that the WCJ relieved the employer of that obligation.
As discussed infra, Claimant's petition to reinstate benefits for the 1994 injury was moot inasmuch as Employer failed to petition for a suspension of those benefits upon Claimant's return to work. Hence, the operative document pertaining to the 1994 work injury was the 1995 supplemental agreement reinstating benefits. Thus, Claimant's petition to reinstate benefits for the 1994 injury was not properly before the WCJ and the order denying Claimant's reinstatement petition was a nullity. Id.
Once Claimant was no longer working, Employer was required to resume the payment of benefits until its obligation was terminated in a manner authorized by the Act. Id. Employer recognizes its obligation to resume payment for the 1994 injury inasmuch is it has cross-appealed on the issue of whether the Board correctly held that Claimant's petition to reinstate benefits for the 1994 injury was moot.
With regard to the 2001 back injury, we disagree with Claimant that the Board erred by failing to order the payment of benefits. When Claimant began working at wages equal to his pre-injury wage as a dock worker, Employer was relieved of its obligation to pay benefits relative to the 2001 injury. See generally Section 413(c) of the Act, 77 P.S. § 774.2; 309 Nissan v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board (Horowitz), 819 A.2d 126 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003)(where the claimant returned to pre-injury position with same earning power, the employer was entitled to a suspension of benefits).
Undisputedly, Claimant returned to work in July 2001 and remained in that position until he was laid off. The WCJ's order suspended Claimant's benefits as of July 16, 2001, the date upon which he returned to work. Consequently, at the time of Claimant's lay off on February 22, 2002, his benefits were suspended, albeit retroactively, and Employer was
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 Pennsylvania Employee Leasing Services
Employee Leasing Services
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Employee Leasing Services in your area.
|
|