Tressler v. Specialty Transportation Services9/16/2005
DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
{ } This is an appeal of the judgment of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas which granted appellee, Catherine Tressler, summary judgment and denied appellant's, Specialty Transportation Services Inc., motion for summary judgment. For the reasons set forth below, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
{ } On appeal, appellant sets forth a single assignment of error:
{ } "The trial court erred in concluding that Catherine Tressler was injured during the course and scope of her employment with Specialty Transportation Services, Inc."
{ } The following undisputed facts are relevant to the issue raised on appeal. Appellee was employed for approximately ten years as a van driver for appellant. Appellee transported special needs children to and from school. Each morning appellee worked, she first went to appellant's garage to pick up her assigned van. Tressler's van blocked access to the other vans at the facility as it was always parked first. Appellee would then drive the van to her home to wait for the starting time of her route. Appellant concedes it was aware of employees' practice of taking company vehicles home during "down time." Appellant never objected to, or advised employees in any way, that this practice would not be permitted. In fact, appellant furnished appellee a copy of the garage key to enable her unilateral access to the garage.
{ } On March 6, 2003, appellee went to the garage, picked up the van, and returned home until it was time to start her route. During this period of "down time", it snowed. Accordingly, appellee began to clear snow off of the van so that she could begin her route. While clearing snow from the van, appellee slipped and sustained injuries.
{ } On March 31, 2003, appellee filed a claim with the Bureau of Workers' Compensation for injuries she sustained on March 6, 2003. On April 10, 2003, the Administrator of the Bureau of Workers' Compensation issued an order allowing the claim. Appellant appealed the claim and the case was assigned to a district hearing officer. A hearing was conducted on July 7, 2003, and the district hearing officer vacated the April 10, 2003, allowance of the claim. Appellee filed an appeal. On August 13, 2003, a staff hearing officer vacated the district hearing officer's order and reinstated appellee's claim. Appellant submitted an appeal to the Industrial Commission. This appeal was refused on September 18, 2003. On October 21, 2003, appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. Appellee filed a timely complaint on November 13, 2003.
{ } On August 6, 2004, appellee filed for summary judgment. Appellant filed its opposition on August 11, 2004, and filed its own motion for summary judgment on August 18, 2004. On September 23, 2004, the trial court issued a ruling denying appellant's motion for summary judgment and granting appellee's motion for summary judgment. The trial court ruled, in relevant part, "Plaintiff's injuries of left hip and thigh sprain and fracture of left humerus occurred in the course of and arising out of her employment." The court further determined, "Plaintiff is entitled, as a matter of law, to participate in the benefits of the Workers' Compensation Act." It is this summary judgment being appealed.
{ } We note at the outset an appellate court reviews the trial court's granting of summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard used by the trial court. Lorain Natl. Bank v. Saratoga Apts. (1989), 61 Ohio App.3d 127, 129; Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co. (1996), 77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105. Summary judgment is granted when there remains no genuine issue of material fact and, when construing the evidence
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