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Breen v. Carlsbad Municipal Schools8/15/2005
Christy Ann Breen and Dahlia Carrasco ("Petitioners") suffered temporary total primary mental impairments compensable under the New Mexico Workers' Compensation Act ("the Act"). They appeal a Workers' Compensation Judge's ("WCJ") order limiting their compensation to 100 weeks pursuant to NMSA 1978, Section 52-1-41(B) (1999), even though he found they have been disabled in excess of 240 weeks. Petitioners argue that Section 52-1-41 and NMSA 1978, Section 52-1-42 (1990), of the Act violate the Equal Protection Clause of both the New Mexico and United States Constitutions and the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. ยงยง 12101 to -12213 (2000), because those sections of the Act treat workers with physical impairments differently than workers with mental impairments. These Sections grant compensation for life for total permanent physical disabilities and up to 700 weeks of compensation for permanent partial physical disabilities, yet cap compensation for all primary mental disabilities at 100 weeks. They also argue that the WCJ should have awarded them compensation for the entire time they were disabled based on a prior Court of Appeals memorandum opinion which held Petitioners suffered compensable mental disabilities under the Act without determining the amount of compensation Petitioners were due.
In this current appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the WCJ's determination that the Act did not violate equal protection or the ADA and that the prior Court of Appeals memorandum opinion was properly interpreted as only mandating 100 weeks of compensation. See Breen v. Carlsbad Mun. Sch., 2003-NMCA-058, 3, 5, 133 N.M. 618, 67 P.3d 908. We granted Petitioners' petition for certiorari, pursuant to Rule 12-502 NMRA 2005, and now reverse on equal protection grounds. We hold that Sections 52-1-41 and -42 of the Act violate equal protection guarantees of the New Mexico Constitution by treating mentally disabled workers differently than physically disabled workers. Consequently, we do not reach Petitioners' ADA claim or their claim that the Court of Appeals erred in construing its previous memorandum opinion.
FACTS AND PROCEDURE BELOW
Petitioners were injured when the Carlsbad Municipal Schools remodeled portions of the building where they worked. Odors and dust from the remodeling project caused the Petitioners to suffer a conditioned psychological response that prevented them from continuing to work. The WCJ found that Petitioners suffered a primary mental impairment under the Act and were eligible for compensation. Before the WCJ determined exactly how much compensation Petitioners were entitled to, Respondents filed the first appeal in this case. Respondents challenged the WCJ's determination that Petitioners suffered a compensable primary mental impairment. The Court of Appeals consolidated the two claims, issued a memorandum opinion affirming the determination that Petitioners suffered a compensable primary mental impairment, and returned the case to the WCJ to determine the amount of compensation Petitioners should receive. See Carrasco v. Carlsbad Mun. Sch., Nos. 20,833/20,832 (N.M. Ct. App. May 29, 2001) (consolidated). Respondents' petition for certiorari to this Court from that memorandum opinion was denied.
Calculated from the date of injury, Petitioner Breen had been disabled for 240 weeks and Petitioner Carrasco had been disabled for 233 weeks on the date the Court of Appeals prior memorandum opinion was filed. However, the WCJ awarded Petitioners only 100 weeks of disability compensation in accordance with Section 52-1-41(B).
This appeal is based on Petitioners' Application for Supplementary Compensation Orders filed a
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