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In re M.S.11/1/2005
er skills in a real world setting. The Court was presented with no evidence that indicates that this has changed. Indeed, the mother has had such limited contact with the child, and has shown such little interest in the child since the entry of the aforesaid Permanency Planning Order, that there is no evidence of any change of circumstances which would indicate that the mother has a better understanding of her parental responsibilities.
13. There is a substantial likelihood that should [M.S.] be returned to the home of her mother, the neglect originally found in April, 2000 would recur.
14. For purposes of disposition, the Court notes that [M.S.] has been in the same foster home since December, 2000. She is doing well in this home and has bonded with her foster mother. The foster mother indicates a desire to adopt the child, and there are no barriers to this adoption. Further,there is no intangible bond between the child and her natural parents.
15. There is no intangible bond between the child and her natural parents.
16. Other than providing some support for the child, the mother of the child has done little since the Permanency Planning hearing in this case.
The trial court concluded as a matter of law that:
. . . grounds exist for the termination of the parental rights of the Respondent-parents pursuant to G.S. . 7B-1111(a)(1) . . . that the repetition of neglect is highly likely should the child be returned to either of her parents . . . [and that grounds also exist for termination under] . . . G.S. . 7B-1111(a)(2), in that both of such Respondents have willfully left [M.S.] in foster care for more than twelve (12) months without showing to the satisfaction of the Court that reasonable progress under the circumstances has been made in correcting those conditions which led to the removal of the child.
Upon its conclusion that it was in the best interests of M.S. that her natural parents' rights be terminated, the trial court did so in the 12 August 2004 order now on appeal. Only respondent-mother appeals.
Standard of Review
A court's termination of parental rights is a two-step process: there is an adjudicatory stage to the proceeding under N.C. Gen. Stat. . 7B-1109 (2003), and a dispositional stage under N.C. Gen. Stat. . 7B-1110 (2003). In re Howell, 161 N.C. App. 650, 656, 589 S.E.2d 157, 160-61 (2003). During the adjudication stage, the trial court determines whether clear, cogent, and convincing evidence exists to support at least one of the grounds fortermination under N.C. Gen. Stat. . 7B-1111 (2003). In re Shepard, 162 N.C. App. 215, 220-21, 591 S.E.2d 1, 5 (2004) (citations omitted). Where such evidence is present, the court moves to the dispositional stage, and it considers whether terminating parental rights would be in the best interest of the child. Howell, 161 N.C. App. at 656, 589 S.E.2d at 161 (citation omitted). This Court has described the standard of review for termination of parental rights cases as:
"whether the findings of fact are supported by clear, cogent and convincing evidence and whether these findings, in turn, support the conclusions of law." We then consider, based on the grounds found for termination, whether the trial court abused its discretion in finding termination to be in the best interest of the child.
Shepard, 162 N.C. App. at 221-22, 591 S.E.2d at 6 (quoting In Re Clark, 72 N.C. App. 118, 124, 323 S.E.2d 754, 758 (1984)) (citations omitted).
Respondent argues first that the trial court lacked clear, cogent, and convincing evidence to support findings of fact numbers 10, 13, 15, 16, and portions of 12 and 14. W
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