 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Employee Leasing Services in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Bursell v. General Electric Co.8/2/2005
ermination, simply to gain revenge on the employer"). However, the Commission made no findings regarding whether the disciplinary action was a "legitimate personnel action" or part of plaintiff's "normal work routine." This Court may not substitute its own findings for those made by the Commission. We do not agree with defendants that a "legitimate personnel action" can never involve the interruption of the work routine. Whether or not a particular personnel action is part of an "established sequence of operations" is a factual matter which must be decided on a case-by-case basis. See Gunter,317 N.C. at 675, 346 S.E.2d at 398. "The Workers' Compensation Act should be liberally construed to effectuate its purpose to provide compensation for injured employees and its benefits should not be denied by a narrow, technical and strict construction". Id.at 676-77, 346 S.E.2d at 399.
Because the Commission failed to make sufficient findingsregarding whether the personnel action leading to plaintiff's injury was the "normal work routine" or part of an "established sequence of operations," we cannot determine whether plaintiff sustained an injury by accident under the law. We therefore reverse that portion of the opinion and award of the Commission concluding that plaintiff failed to show he suffered an injury by accident and remand this case to the Commission for additional findings.
B. Occupational Disease
Plaintiff also argues the Commission erred in concluding he failed to show he is suffering from an occupational disease. We reject plaintiff's argument on several grounds.
First, the Commission specifically found that "plaintiff is not claiming that he suffers from an occupational disease." Plaintiff does not take issue with this finding and is therefore bound by it. Second, plaintiff failed to show that his depression was due to "causes and conditions which are characteristic of and peculiar to a particular trade, occupation or employment." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-53(13) (2003) (defining occupational disease); Woody v. Thomasville Upholstery, Inc., 355 N.C. 483, 562 S.E.2d 422 (2002); Clark v. City of Asheville, 161 N.C. App. 717, 721, 589 S.E.2d 384, 387 (2003) (noting that, in order to qualify as an occupational disease, "a plaintiff has to show that hispsychological condition, or the aggravation thereof, was (1) 'due to causes and conditions which are characteristic of and peculiar to a particular trade, occupation or employment' and that it is not (2) an 'ordinary disease of life to which the general public is equally exposed'") (quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-53(13)). Plaintiff presented no evidence, and the Commission made no findings to support a conclusion, that plaintiff's depression was due to causes and conditions characteristic of and peculiar to his employment in the aircraft section of General Electric. We overrule this assignment of error.
II. Defendants' Cross-Assignments of Error
Defendants cross-assign error to several of the Commission's findings as being unsupported by the evidence. Specifically, defendants assign error to the Commission's findings indicating that plaintiff was accused of theft and that he was "fired." They also argue that the Commission's finding as to the action taken by defendant General Electric's peer review committee was incomplete and misleading as it left the impression that plaintiff was exonerated from wrongdoing. We review the record to determine whether the findings about which defendants complain are supported by any competent evidence. Pitillo, 151 N.C. App. at 644, 566 S.E.2d at 810.
Plaintiff testified that, on 28 October 1999, he was summonedto a conference room where he met with Andr
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 North Carolina Employee Leasing Services
Employee Leasing Services
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Employee Leasing Services in your area.
|
|