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Goodson v. N.C. Dep't of Insurance ex rel Long7/19/2005
Commissioner upon cessation of self-insurance "until the self- insurer has discharged fully all the self-insurer's obligations under the Act." As noted supra, the Commission determines an employer's liability under the Act by virtue of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-91. While we agree that DOI has the authority to administer and govern self-insurers' methods of securing their liabilities under the Workers' Compensation Act, nothing in the statutory scheme grants DOI the Commission's authority to determine what those liabilities are. In short, subsections (g) and (h) of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-185 do not, either by implication or expression, allow DOI to make determinations regarding whether a self-insurer has fully discharged its workers' compensation obligations. That determination has been, and remains, the province of the Commission.
It is undisputed that no special release bond was posted by Glatfelter. Additionally, RFS' certificate of deposit cannot be considered a special release bond because RFS is not a "corporate surety." See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-165(5) (2003) (defining a corporate surety as "an insurance company authorized by the Commissioner to write surety business" in North Carolina); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-185(g). Accordingly, DOI improperly released Glatfelter's bond under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-185(h) since Glatfelter had not secured its obligations under the Act in a manner compliant with N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-185(g).
V. Ratification
Glatfelter asserts the actions of DOI and the Commission after the purported assignment of liability to RFS ratified the acquisition agreement. Glatfelter fails to cite any legalauthority or even a legal definition of the term ratification in its brief to this Court. It is not the duty of this Court to supplement an appellant's brief with legal authority or arguments not contained therein. This assignment of error is deemed abandoned by virtue of N.C. R. App. P. 28(b)(6) (2005).
VI. Estoppel
In its next argument, Glatfelter "emphatically contends that both and the [Commission] are estopped from entering any order that requires Glatfelter to fund the workers' compensation claim at issue . . . ." No order of DOI enforcing Glatfelter's liability to plaintiff under the Act is contained in the record or pending before this Court; therefore, we need not address any argument concerning whether DOI is estopped in the instant case. Moreover, Glatfelter cannot assert estoppel against the Commission.
The common law doctrine of equitable estoppel serves "to aid the law in the administration of justice when without its intervention injustice would result[,]" see Thompson v. Soles, 299 N.C. 484, 486, 263 S.E.2d 599, 602 (1980), and prevents one from asserting a right otherwise available to him against another if his own conduct would render such an assertion of that right against the other unfair. LSB Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Harrison, 144 N.C. App. 542, 548, 548 S.E.2d 574, 579 (2001). "Equitable estoppel is established by evidence that an individual . . . induces another to believe that certain facts exist and that other person rightfully relies on those facts to his detriment." Bunn Lake Prop. Owner'sAss'n v. Setzer, 149 N.C. App. 289, 297, 560 S.E.2d 576, 582 (2002) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Assuming arguendo that Glatfelter could otherwise use the doctrine of estoppel to preclude the Commission from carrying out its duties under the Act, the actions necessary to effectuate the intended transfer of liabilities occurred before the Commission was involved in this action in any way or was even informed that the transfer was being attempted. Notably, no action by the Commission occurred u
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