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Sherner v. National Loss Control Services Corp.11/15/2005
y members were prohibited from providing Peter's home health care, she arranged the subcontract between Bernice and Trevor.
The State later moved to dismiss the criminal charge against Peter, and the charge was dismissed on March 1, 2001. Bernice ultimately pled guilty to felony theft by common scheme.
The Sherners filed the complaint in the present case on January 4, 2002. They sought damages on the basis of allegations that Conoco, National, Crawford, and Andersen instigated the criminal proceedings against Peter and withheld information from the State Auditor that negated the allegations of wrongdoing against him. Andersen moved for summary judgment and the District Court granted her motion in March of 2003. The remaining defendants also moved for summary judgment and, after a hearing, the District Court granted all defendants' motions on December 9, 2003, stating the defendants would be awarded their costs.
Conoco, Crawford and National submitted bills of costs on December 16, 2003. On December 17, 2003, the District Court entered judgment against the Sherners and assessed costs in the full amount sought by these defendants. On January 6, 2004, the court filed an order entitled "Notice," apparently entered sua sponte, in which it stated it had taxed costs on December 31, 2003, as requested by defendants after noting no objections by the Sherners. Attached to the court's order was a copy of the December 17, 2003 judgment. This appeal followed.
This Court's review of a district court's grant of summary judgment is de novo and we apply the criteria contained in Rule 56, M.R.Civ.P. The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of establishing both the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. If this burden is met, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to prove, by more than mere denial and speculation, that a genuine issue of material fact exists which precludes summary judgment. We review a district court's legal determinations to determine whether the conclusions are correct. Farmers Union Mut.Ins. Co. v. Staples, 2004 MT 108, 18, 321 Mont. 99, 18, 90 P.3d 381, 18 (citations omitted).
ISSUE ONE
Did the District Court err in granting summary judgment to Andersen on the basis that she acted within the course and scope of her employment?
The Sherners first argue that the District Court erred when it concluded Andersen's conduct fell within the scope of her employment as an adjuster for Crawford and, therefore, she was not subject to personal liability for her actions. Generally, employees and agents of a corporation are shielded from personal liability for acts taken on behalf of the corporation. Phillips v. Montana Ed. Ass'n (1980), 187 Mont. 419, 424-25, 610 P.2d 154, 157-58. The Sherners argue that a reasonable jury could have concluded that Andersen was personally liable under § 28-10-702(3), MCA, which states that an agent is personally responsible to third persons for the agent's wrongful acts.
We have interpreted § 28-10-702(3), MCA, to mean that " n order to hold a corporate agent personally liable, the [trial] court must find that the agent was personally negligent or that the agent's actions were tortious in nature." Crystal Springs Trout Co. v. First State Bank of Froid (1987), 225 Mont. 122, 129, 732 P.2d 819, 823. "The personal nature of the agent's actions forms the narrow exception to the general policy that officers and agents of a corporation must be shielded from personal liability for acts taken on behalf of the corporation." Crystal Springs, 225 Mont. at 129, 732 P.2d at 823 (citation omitted).
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