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Hellmann v. Union School District8/23/2005
fying charges listed only "competency lacking in quality of performance, and competency lacking in general responsibility" as the grounds for termination. Iven , 710 S.W.2d at 466. We held that these grounds fell short of the specificity requirement because they made it impossible for the teacher to know what grounds would be tried at the termination hearing. Id. Likewise, in Dameron , the teacher received a letter which listed five general areas of unsatisfactory work which the appellate court found to be "noninformative allegations" leaving the teacher ill-prepared for his hearing. Dameron, 549 S.W.2d at 677.
The holdings in both cases turned on each district's respective failure to detail specific incidents of misconduct, which would serve as the basis for later charges of incompetency, inefficiency and insubordination. Neither case turned on a board's failure to cite to specific "school laws of the state" or "published regulations of the board" in its written charges alleging the willful and persistent violation of state or federal school laws.
In this case, Ms. Hellmann received particularized, written charges detailing the grounds for her termination, including instances of specific deficient conduct. The grounds alleged in the written charges cited provisions of state school law and Board policy and tracked the evidence later presented at Ms. Hellmann's termination hearing. In light of the fact that the purpose of the specificity requirement of Section 168.116 is to ensure that the teacher has notice of the complaints against her in order to allow her to adequately prepare for the termination hearing, we find that the written charges served on Ms. Hellmann complied with Section 168.116. Point denied.
In her final point on appeal, Ms. Hellmann contends that the Board's decision to terminate her teaching contract was arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable and in excess of statutory authority. Specifically, Ms. Hellmann asserts that the Board applied an incorrect legal construction of Section 168.114.1(4) in that it did not: (1) reference a law which forbade or commanded action by a teacher; and (2) prove that Ms. Hellmann willfully and knowingly violated such law. In response, the District argues that the Board's decision specifically concludes that Board Policy IGBA requires that District programs and services comply with state and Local plans for Part B of the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. Section 1400 et seq ., and that Ms. Hellmann's failure to comply with the IDEA's paperwork requirements both as to timeliness and accuracy ran afoul of Board Policy IGBA.
As an initial matter, we disagree with Ms. Hellmann's contention that Section 168.114.1(4) does not apply to violations of the IDEA because it is a federal law rather than a state school law. Missouri incorporated the IDEA into state law in Section 162.670, which provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
...it is hereby declared the policy of the state of Missouri to provide or to require public schools to provide to all handicapped and severely handicapped children within the ages prescribed herein, as an integral part of Missouri's system of gratuitous education, a free appropriate education consistent with the provisions set forth in state and federal regulations implementing the Individuals with Disabilities Education Action (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. Section 1400 et seq. and any amendments thereto.
Section 162.670 RSMo Cum. Sup. 2002. Thus, a teacher who fails to comply with requirements of the IDEA violates a school law of the state.
We next address Ms. Hellmann's contention that the Board's decision violates Section 168.114.1(4) because it
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