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Brink v. Smith Companies Construction9/27/2005
Appellant, a general contractor, challenges the district court's grant of summary judgment for respondents, who are subcontractors, which dismissed appellant's third-party claims for contribution and indemnity asserted against respondents. Appellant brought its third-party claims in February 2003 after it was sued for breach of warranty in December 2002. The district court concluded that the statute of repose in Minn. Stat. § 541.051, subd. 1(a) (2002), barred appellant's third-party claims. Appellant argues that application of the statute to bar its third-party claims is a violation of its constitutional rights to due process and a remedy. Because we conclude that the statute of repose, as applied to the facts of this case, unconstitutionally violates appellant's rights to due process and a remedy, we reverse.
FACTS
The facts in this case are undisputed. On June 2, 1989, the City of White Bear Lake issued a certificate of occupancy for a townhouse owned by appellant Smith Companies Construction, Inc. (Smith) and subsequently purchased by plaintiff Richard Brink. On December 27, 2002, plaintiff sued Smith under Minn. Stat. § 327A.02 (2002), alleging that the townhouse was not constructed in a workmanlike manner and was in violation of statutory warranties because of water intrusion. On February 3, 2003, Smith filed third-party actions for contribution and indemnity against various subcontractors, including respondents D.A. Distribution, Inc., d/b/a Coronado Stone, and Station 19 Architects. Respondents moved for summary judgment, arguing that Smith's claims were barred by the statute of repose contained in Minn. Stat. § 541.051, subd. 1(a) (2002). Smith opposed the motions for summary judgment on the ground that subdivision 1(a) is unconstitutional as applied.
The district court granted respondents' motions for summary judgment. This appeal follows. Respondents have also made a joint motion to strike portions of Smith's reply brief.
ISSUES
1. Does Minn. Stat. § 541.051, subd. 1(a) (2002), unconstitutionally infringe on Smith's due-process rights and its right to a remedy?
2. Should respondents' joint motion to strike portions of Smith's reply brief be granted?
ANALYSIS
Summary judgment may be granted if the pleadings, depositions, interrogatory answers, admissions, and affidavits reveal that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.03. In an appeal from a grant of summary judgment, appellate courts determine if there are any genuine issues of material fact and if the lower court erred in its application of the law. N. States Power Co. v. Minn. Metro. Council, 684 N.W.2d 485, 491 (Minn. 2004).
I.
Smith contends that Minn. Stat. § 541.051 (2002) is unconstitutional as applied to the facts of this case, and specifically that Minn. Stat. § 541.051, subd. 1(a), violates its due-process rights under the United States and Minnesota constitutions and its right to a remedy under the Minnesota constitution. Our evaluation of a statute's constitutionality is a question of law subject to de novo review. Hamilton v. Comm'r of Pub. Safety, 600 N.W.2d 720, 722 (Minn. 1999). We presume that Minnesota statutes are constitutional, and "our power to declare a statute unconstitutional should be exercised with extreme caution and only when absolutely necessary." In re Haggerty, 448 N.W.2d 363, 364 (Minn. 1989). "A party who challenges a Minnesota statute as unconstitutional bears the burden of establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that the statute violates some constitutional provision." Sartori v. Harnischfeg
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