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State v. Gomez10/13/2005
is added). We further explained:
" rejudice" does not mean the damage to the opponent's case that results from the legitimate probative force of the evidence, rather it refers to the unfair advantage that results from the capacity of the evidence to persuade by illegitimate means.
Id. at 197 n.3 (citation omitted).
Gomez claims that the trial court concluded that the Spreigl evidence was unfairly prejudicial but admitted the evidence anyway. However, the transcript reflects that the court recognized the prejudicial nature of the Spreigl evidence and carefully weighed it against the probative value of the evidence. The court decided that the correct application of the law was to admit the evidence of Gomez's other crimes. In doing so, the trial court stated:
I'll state for the record that * * * there is very little doubt in my mind that this evidence is going to be highly prejudicial and it ought not be received, but the state of the law in Minnesota I think is such that it would be received in most trials, and I've looked at the cases carefully and commentaries on the cases, so what I say is, I say it should not be received is a broader statement in policy, but I say it for the record, were I working on a clean slate here, I would not use it as evidence. It is virtually inconceivable to me that the jury won't, to some extent, conclude that Mr. Gomez has a propensity to rob old people and beat them up, which of course is exactly the reason this evidence is excluded under Rule 404, and it doesn't fit any of the standard exceptions to Rule 404, but it does hit these cases that talk about modus operandi and signature crimes, and so forth.
The courts have repeatedly held, and the State cited in its memo a couple of cases that are relatively similar to the present case, homicide cases where earlier incidents were received, and I don't believe that I can exclude them without simply ignoring these cases, and I don't think it's within my authority to do that, as much as I do disapprove of it.
I've looked at [the Spreigl evidence] with some care, trying to control the prejudice as best I can. What I propose to do without dictating the precise terms of it, counsel, is to allow you to elicit the fact
* * *.
I don't want * * * those crimes to overwhelm this case, as they have a chance of doing. I've gone through the usual Spriegl analysis. Most of the factors are not even clear and convincing, of course, as established by the guilty plea. The similarity is sufficient, of course, and that's why I'm letting them in * * * they're close enough to satisfy any Spriegl analysis.
The remoteness is satisfied by the fact he was incarcerated.
I've given a great deal of thought, and that is where I stand on these issues now. I'll instruct the jury as to the use of this evidence as best I can.
In admitting the evidence, the trial court, after consulting with the state and Gomez's counsel, gave a proper limiting instruction to the jury as to the use of the other crimes evidence both at the time the evidence was admitted and as part of the final instructions before jury deliberations.
Although the trial court expressed its personal view that as a matter of policy Spreigl evidence of the type admitted here should not be admissible, the trial court correctly ruled that the probative value of the evidence at issue outweighed the potential prejudice. The trial court appropriately instructed the jury to limit the use of such evidence.
In that we have concluded that the evidence of Gomez's past crimes was relevant and material and that the probative value of the eviden
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