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State v. Gomez10/13/2005
for one of the attorneys to object.
The acts of the trial court were without a doubt spontaneous and maybe awkward, but they were not the type of acts that undermine the structural integrity of the court. Rather, they appear to have been intended to maintain both the integrity of the jury selection process and the court's integrity. The record demonstrates that at the time the court acted, the state had not articulated on the record its intent to strike venireperson 21, but the court either knew or correctly anticipated the strike. Further, the state's reasons for the strike appear to have been known by the parties. This fact is shown by defense counsel's response to the court's inquiry. Defense counsel gave the following response when questioned by the court about whether counsel thought that the strike is "racially motivated": " s I understand the concern that the State has is that she, this woman believes that her father was unjustly convicted." This statement shows defense counsel's awareness that the state would strike the witness and why. I conclude that the court's assumption of an active role in this context did not impugn the court's integrity. While I caution courts to proceed carefully when intervening sua sponte after recognizing racial overtones and racial patterns that implicate Batson, I also do not believe that we should unduly chill or discourage courts from acting when they deem it appropriate. I fear that the latter will be the result of the majority's decision.
The Specific Actions of the Court
As indicated above, after defense counsel questioned and then accepted venireperson 21, the trial court, based on the answers solicited by defense counsel, correctly anticipated a peremptory strike by the state that implicated Batson concerns. See State v. Herron, No. 19894, 2004 WL 315232 at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 20, 2004) (affirming the trial court's Batson ruling when the court anticipated the state might exercise a peremptory challenge to exclude a venireperson from the jury). The court then solicited a response from defense counsel that amounted to step one of a Batson challenge--a prima facie showing that the state was exercising its peremptory strike on the basis of race. In response, the state proceeded to step two of Batson and stated its reasons for striking venireperson 21--articulation of a race-neutral explanation for the strike. The state referred to the "tragic circumstance" that occurred in the venireperson's life at a very young age and her having testified for the defense on behalf of her father. The state then said: "[She is] still convinced that the evidence certainly didn't justify having her father in prison, and then once he came out of prison, the father, came back to live in the household with she and a younger sister. * * * It's just a situation that's untenable." (Emphasis added.)
After hearing the state's explanation, the trial court, without waiting for a response from defense counsel under step three of Batson, apparently shifted gears in its analysis--now focusing on removal for cause by saying it would probably deny a challenge for cause if the juror continued to say she could be fair. But immediately after saying that it would deny a challenge for cause, the court apparently shifted gears once again, returned to step three of Batson, and excused venireperson 21, saying "it would be bordering on ineffective representation not to challenge her because of that. So I'll excuse her. * * * It's clear there is a valid and mutual reason." While the antecedent for "that" and "valid and mutual reason" is not clear, the terms appear to reference the specific reasons given by the state for why it concluded venireperson 21 should not sit a
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