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State v. Gomez10/13/2005
itself a party to the [biased act], but has elected to place its power, property, and prestige behind the [alleged] discrimination." In so doing, the government has "create the legal framework governing the [challenged] conduct," and in a significant way has involved itself with invidious discrimination.
Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 624 (brackets in original) (citations omitted).
The next year, in Lemley v. State, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals followed Powers and Edmonson when it emphasized the important role of the trial court in preventing discrimination during jury selection. The Alabama court said:
trial judge is authorized to conduct a Batson hearing, even in the absence of an objection by the State to defense counsel's exercise of his peremptory strikes. " ecause racial discrimination in the selection of jurors 'casts doubt on the integrity of the judicial process,' Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 556, 99 S.Ct. 2993, 3000, 61 L.Ed.2d 739 (1979), and places the fairness of a criminal proceeding in doubt," Powers v. Ohio, ___ U.S. at ___, 111 S.Ct. at 1371, the trial judge, as the presiding officer of the court, should take the necessary steps to ensure that discrimination will not mar the proceedings in his courtroom.
Lemley v. State, 599 So.2d 64, 69-70 (Ala. Ct. App. 1992). The Alabama court also said why the trial court can and, in fact, should act sua sponte to prevent discrimination, even if it does so without waiting for counsel to make a Batson objection. A court should not permit itself to become involved in "invidious discrimination." The Alabama court said:
he notion that by allowing racial discrimination to occur, the trial judge actually becomes a part of that discrimination is applicable to the trial judge who, in a case with racial overtones, recognizes a racial pattern to counsel's peremptory strikes, yet takes no steps to inquire into counsel's motivation. By closing his eyes to the possible discrimination, the judge "in a significant way has involved self with invidious discrimination."
Lemley, 599 So.2d at 70 (quoting Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 624). I agree with the conclusion articulated by the Alabama court. Moreover, based on the decisions of the Supreme Court, there can be no doubt that when racial discrimination is evident during the jury selection process, a court has an obligation to act and to act sua sponte when necessary to prevent discrimination.
In light of the foregoing precepts and principles, I conclude that the majority's analysis leading to its conclusion that the trial court was an advocate is flawed because it fails to fully recognize the role the court plays as a legitimate actor when the concerns articulated in Batson and its progeny are implicated as a result of the racial overtones of a particular case. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.02, subd. 6a(2). Without a doubt, there were racial overtones involved in this case. The victims were Caucasian, the defendant is African American, venireperson 21 is a member of a protected racial group, and at least one other venireperson had already been subjected to a Batson challenge. When dealing with venireperson 21, the court must have been aware of these racial overtones and the possibility of a racial pattern to the peremptory strikes. As a "direct and indispensable participant" in the effort to eliminate discrimination from the courtroom, the court had the right, even the obligation, to act in the presence of possible discrimination. This includes the right to act sua sponte to protect venirepersons and the community at large from discrimination. I conclude that under the circumstances here there was no absolute obligation for the court to wait
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