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Edwards v. Pontiac School District8/4/2005
UNPUBLISHED
Before: Borrello, P.J., and Bandstra and Kelly, JJ.
Plaintiff, a schoolteacher in defendant's school district, was not hired for three assistant principal positions at high schools in the district and was not allowed to interview for a fourth assistant principal position at a middle school. Defendant Burt was the superintendent of the district, and defendant Dunn was the assistant superintendent of human resources and employee relations for the district. Plaintiff alleged that defendants discriminated against her because of her age in violation of the Civil Rights Act (CRA), MCL 37.2101 et seq. The trial court granted defendants' motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10). Plaintiff appeals as of right. We affirm. This case is being decided without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
We review de novo a trial court's decision on a motion for summary disposition. Hazle v Ford Motor Co, 464 Mich 456, 461; 628 NW2d 515 (2001). A motion for summary disposition brought under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual support for a claim. Id. After reviewing the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, admissions, and any other evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, a trial court may grant summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) if there is no genuine issue concerning any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Morales v Auto-Owners Ins Co, 458 Mich 288, 294; 582 NW2d 776 (1998).
Plaintiff argues that the trial court erroneously dismissed her claim against the school district because she presented direct evidence of discrimination. Plaintiff testified that in a conversation with Dunn concerning why she was not selected, he advised her that she needed additional credit hours in administration and supervision. She replied that she would take additional hours. In response, he said that even if she took the hours, she would have "tough competition." She responded, "Mr. Dunn, what you're telling me is, no matter what I do, I will never get an administrative job in this school district." According to plaintiff, Dunn did not respond to her comment but told her, "you remind me of somebody's mother."
Direct evidence of discrimination is "evidence which, if believed, requires the conclusion that unlawful discrimination was at least a motivating factor in the employer's actions." Sniecinski v Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 469 Mich 124, 133; 666 NW2d 186 (2003) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Racial slurs and derogatory remarks about one's race made by a decisionmaker are examples of direct evidence of racial discrimination. Harrison v Olde Financial Corp, 225 Mich App 601, 610; 572 NW2d 679 (1997). Statements by a decisionmaker such as, "If I have to, I will get rid of the older guys-you older guys and replace you with younger ones," were deemed "direct evidence" of discrimination in Downey v Charlevoix Co Bd of Co Rd Comm'rs, 227 Mich App 621, 633-634; 576 NW2d 712 (1998). Viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, a supervisor's statement, "[You're] getting too old for this shit," made during the conversation in which he terminated the plaintiff was found to be sufficient direct evidence of discrimination to survive summary disposition in DeBrow v Century 21 Great Lakes, Inc (After Remand), 463 Mich 534, 538-539; 620 NW2d 836 (2001). Our Supreme Court recognized that a factfinder may conclude that the "facially incriminating remark" was "an expression of sympathy," but held that such weighing of evidence was for the factfinder, not a court reviewing a motion for summary disposition. Id. at 539.
In contrast to those statements, the re
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