Haygood v. Salvation Army10/11/2005
UNPUBLISHED
Before: Hood, P.J., and White and O'Connell, JJ.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from the trial court's order granting summary disposition in favor of defendant, The Salvation Army ("defendant"). We affirm.
Defendant discharged plaintiff from its employ. Plaintiff claimed defendant discharged him on account of sex. On appeal, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in finding no genuine issues of material fact with respect to direct evidence of unlawful discrimination or circumstantial evidence of discrimination. We disagree.
This Court reviews a trial court's decision on a motion for summary disposition de novo. Dressel v Ameribank, 468 Mich 557, 561; 664 NW2d 151 (2003). A motion brought pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) should be granted when there is no genuine issue of any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Miller v Purcell, 246 Mich App 244, 246; 631 NW2d 760 (2001). When the burden of proof at trial would rest on the nonmoving party, the non-movant may not rest upon mere allegations or denials in the pleadings, but must, by documentary evidence, set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Quinto v Cross & Peters Co, 451 Mich 358, 362; 547 NW2d 314 (1996); Karbel v Comerica Bank, 247 Mich App 90, 97; 635 NW2d 69 (2001). A genuine issue of material fact exists when the record, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, leaves open an issue on which reasonable minds could differ. West v GMC, 469 Mich 177, 183; 665 NW2d 468 (2003). When deciding a motion for summary disposition based on this rule, a court must consider the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, admissions, and other documentary evidence then filed in the action or submitted by the parties in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. MCR 2.116(G)(5); Ritchie-Gamester v City of Berkley, 461 Mich 73, 76; 597 NW2d 517 (1999).
The Civil Rights Act, MCL 37.2101 et seq., prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex. MCL 37.2202(1)(a); Elezovic v Ford Motor Co, 472 Mich 408, 419; 697 NW2d 851 (2005). An employer cannot make an adverse employment decision on the basis of the employee's sex. MCL 37.2202(1)(a). A plaintiff may prove discrimination by direct or circumstantial evidence. DeBrow v Century 21 Great Lakes, Inc (After Remand), 463 Mich 534, 539-540; 620 NW2d 836 (2001). Where a plaintiff has direct evidence of bias, he can go forward and prove unlawful discrimination in the same manner as a plaintiff in any other civil case. Hazle v Ford Motor Co, 464 Mich 456, 462; 628 NW2d 515 (2001). Where there is direct evidence of unlawful discrimination, the shifting burden of proofs required in McDonnell Douglas Corp v Green, 411 US 792; 93 S Ct 1817; 36 L Ed 2d 668 (1973), do not apply. DeBrow, supra at 539. Direct evidence means evidence, which, if believed, requires the conclusion that unlawful discrimination was at least a motivating factor in the employer's actions. Sniecinski v Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 469 Mich 124, 132-133; 666 NW2d 186 (2003). A single remark from a supervisor in the context of a discussion regarding a plaintiff's termination, even if the statement might be subject to multiple interpretations, is sufficient to constitute direct evidence, and the remark's weight and believability are strictly matters for the finder of fact. DeBrow, supra at 538-541. But where the remark in question is not made by a person involved in the termination of a plaintiff's employment, it is irrelevant and cannot be attributed to the employer. Krohn v Sedgwick James of Michigan, Inc, 244 Mich App 289, 301-302; 624 NW2d 212 (2001).
Plaintiff relies on one remark
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