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Dauberman v. Michigan Automotive Compressor7/19/2005
UNPUBLISHED
Before: Fitzgerald, P.J., and Meter and Owens, JJ.
In this case alleging religious discrimination, plaintiff appeals as of right from the trial court's orders granting defendants summary disposition and denying his motion to amend his complaint to add a retaliation claim against defendant Kelly Services, Inc. (KSI). We affirm.
We review a trial court's decision on a motion for summary disposition de novo. Nastal v Henderson & Assoc Investigations, Inc, 471 Mich 712, 720; 691 NW2d 1 (2005). A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual support for a claim. Id. at 721. Our review is limited to the substantively admissible evidence that was offered in support of and in opposition to the motion, MCR 2.116(G)(5); Veenstra v Washtenaw Country Club, 466 Mich 155, 163; 645 NW2d 643 (2002), and we must consider the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Nastal supra. Where the submitted evidence fails to establish a genuine issue of material fact, the moving party should be granted judgment as a matter of law. Id.
Plaintiff first argues that the trial court applied an unduly restrictive interpretation of the Elliot Larson Civil Rights Act (ELCRA) -- when it stated that ELCRA did not protect employees who discussed religion during work hours after having been asked not to do so by disinterested parties -- because the act protects against discrimination based on status as well as conduct.
ELCRA provides that an employer shall not ail or refuse to hire or recruit, discharge, or otherwise discriminate against an individual with respect to employment, compensation, or a term, condition, or privilege of employment, because of religion, race, color, national origin, age, sex, height, weight, or marital status. [MCL 37.2202(1)(a).]
We agree with plaintiff that the statute encompasses both religious practices and beliefs.
In determining the scope of protection afforded by the statute, we examine the statutory language and give the words used by the Legislature their common and ordinary meaning. Nastal, supra at 720. Dictionary definitions may be consulted to determine the common usage of a word. Id. at 723. The meaning of a word or statute must also be determined from the context or setting in which it is used. Breighner v. Michigan High School Athletic Ass'n, 471 Mich 217, 232; 683 NW2d 639 (2004). The word "religion" is defined in Random House Webster's College Dictionary (2001) as:
1. a set of beliefs concerning the cause, nature, and purpose of the universe, esp., when considered as the creation of a superhuman agency or agencies, usu. involving devotional and ritual observances, and often containing a moral code for the conduct of human affairs. 2. a specific fundamental set of beliefs and practices generally agreed upon by a number of persons or sects: the Christian religion. 3. the body of persons adhering to a particular set of beliefs and practices: a world council of religions. . . . 5. the practice of religious beliefs; ritual observance of faith. 6. something a person believes in and follows devotedly. . . . [Emphasis in original.]
Had the Legislature intended to preclude protection for religious practices, it would have qualified the word "religion," as was done with respect to "marital status" in MCL 37.2202(1)(a). See Veenstra, supra at160. Nevertheless, this is not a case involving a claim of a religiously mandated observance. Plaintiff's own deposition testimony established that he was not required to share his religious beliefs in the workplace, particularly when it burdened a co-worker who did not want to hear what he had to say. A personal need to shar
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