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Woolner v. Allegan County9/27/2005
vides no additional evidence, and she admits that Campbell intervened in the interim to improve the office atmosphere for her.
Even if plaintiff could establish a prima facie case of retaliation, Allegan County carried its burden of articulating a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for plaintiff's discharge. Hazle v Ford Motor Co, 464 Mich 456, 462-466; 628 NW2d 515 (2001). The county eliminated plaintiff's position in conjunction with a cost-reduction plan and an outside consultant's report that recommended elimination of her position. Plaintiff contends that this reason was pretextual for retaliation, because her job was the only one eliminated, and her termination did not save the county much money. A work force reduction can, however, legitimately consist of the elimination of only one employee. Taylor, supra at 660. The county explained that plaintiff's job was eliminated because she had the least seniority and her duties could be easily reassigned to other employees. Plaintiff has not shown that this was a pretext for discrimination.
Plaintiff argues that Allegan County violated other provisions of MCL 37.2701, but these issues are waived on appeal because they were not raised in the statement of questions presented. Wallad v Access BIDCO, Inc, 236 Mich App 303, 309; 600 NW2d 664 (1999); MCR 7.212(C)(5). In any event, we are not persuaded. Plaintiff claims that Deetz's and Campbell's "deal" whereby Deetz received a $50,000 severance payment violated MCL 37.2701(e), which prohibits " illful obstruct or prevent[ion of] a person from complying with this act . . . ." There is no evidence that Deetz improperly influenced Campbell's or the county's severance payment decision, and there is no evidence that the $50,000 severance payment was illegal or improper. Plaintiff also claims that the county violated MCL 37.2701(f), which provides that a person shall not " oerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with a person . . . on account of his or her having aided or encouraged any other person in the exercise or enjoyment of, any right granted or protected by this act." Plaintiff relies entirely on inadmissible hearsay that may not be used to establish a question of fact precluding summary disposition. MRE 801; MRE 802; Maiden, supra at 125.
Finally, plaintiff claims that the trial court erred in dismissing her intentional infliction of emotional distress claim against Deetz. We disagree.
To establish a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must prove (1) extreme and outrageous conduct, (2) intent or recklessness, (3) causation, and (4) severe emotional distress. Hayley v Allstate Ins Co, 262 Mich App 571, 577; 686 NW2d 273 (2004). The conduct complained of must be so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Id. A defendant is not liable for mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities. Lewis v LeGrow, 258 Mich App 175, 196; 670 NW2d 675 (2003). Whether the offending conduct is extreme and outrageous is initially a question of law for the court. Id. at 197. Where reasonable minds may differ, the jury decides whether a defendant's conduct is so extreme and outrageous as to warrant liability. Id.
Deetz's emails and jokes were clownish, puerile, unprofessional, and in some instances mildly sexual, but they cannot reasonably be described as outrageous, atrocious, or utterly intolerable. We doubt they would be remarkable to anyone familiar with contemporary popular culture. The alleged touching incidents involved a few occasions when Deetz lightly and br
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