Dorman v. Norton Co.7/15/2005
Worcester.
November 16, 2004
Present: Greenberg, Cowin, & Doerfer, JJ.
Employment, Discrimination, Termination. Anti-Discrimination Law, Employment, Age, Termination of employment. Unlawful Interference. Contract, Interference with contractual relations. Public Policy.
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on September 7, 2000.
The case was heard by Kenneth J. Fishman, J., on a motion for summary judgment.
The plaintiff, Edgar W. Dorman, appeals from a judgment of dismissal of his complaint of age discrimination in employment, see G. L. c. 151B, ยง 4(1B), intentional interference with contractual relations, and employment termination in violation of public policy following the entry of summary judgment in favor of the defendants on each count. In a comprehensive opinion, a judge of the Superior Court applied the three-stage order of proof established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), and adopted by the Supreme Judicial Court with respect to proceedings under G. L. c. 151B, see Wheelock College v. Massachusetts Commn. Against Discrimination, 371 Mass. 130, 134-136 (1976). Pursuant thereto, the judge assumed that the plaintiff had satisfied the first-stage obligation to present evidence sufficient to make out a prima facie case of discrimination; determined that the defendant employer, Norton Company (Norton or employer), had satisfied its second-stage burden of production by articulating and supporting a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating the plaintiff's employment; and ultimately ruled, with respect to the third stage, that the plaintiff had not offered admissible evidence sufficient to warrant a finding that at least one of the employer's proffered reasons was untrue or that, on other grounds, the termination was motivated by a discriminatory intent. See Blare v. Husky Injection Molding Sys. Boston, Inc., 419 Mass. 437, 446 (1995); Abramian v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, 432 Mass. 107, 118 (2000); Lipchitz v. Raytheon Co., 434 Mass. 493, 501 (2001).
The defendants prevailed on their motion for summary judgment with respect to the remaining counts as well. With regard to the plaintiff's claim against the individual defendants for intentional interference with contractual relations, the judge determined that the plaintiff's failure to demonstrate a discriminatory motive on the part of the employer or its agents precluded the possibility that the plaintiff could show the element of "improper motive or means" required to prevail in an intentional interference case. See Weber v. Community Teamwork, Inc., 434 Mass. 761, 781 (2001). Likewise, the judge ruled that the plaintiff's contention that termination of his employment was motivated by his earlier report of employee theft of copper scrap, even if correct, did not rise to the level of a public policy concern that would limit the employer's rights with respect to what was otherwise at-will employment. See Mello v. Stop & Shop Cos., 402 Mass. 555, 560-561 (1988).
On appeal, the plaintiff argues in essence that he presented, in the summary judgment record, admissible evidence sufficient to support a finding that at least one of the employer's proffered reasons was false, thereby making permissible (though not obligatory) an inference by the fact finder that the employer's real motivation for the termination was discriminatory. See Lipchitz v. Raytheon Co., supra. It follows, the argument continues, that a fact finder would be warranted in finding that the employer's agents (defendants Clark and Gustafson) acted with improper motive or by improper means when they brought about termin
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