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Palmer v. Alliance Compressors11/2/2005
Court composed of Glenn B. Gremillion, J. David Painter, and James T. Genovese, Judges.
AFFIRMED.
In this workers' compensation case, Plaintiff, Tina Palmer ("Palmer"), appeals the judgment of the Workers' Compensation Judge ("WCJ") denying her claim for supplemental earnings benefits ("SEB"), penalties, and attorney fees. For the following reasons, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The parties stipulated that Palmer was injured on August 21, 2002, in the course and scope of her employment with Alliance Compressors ("Alliance") and that she was treated by an orthopaedist, Dr. John P. Sandifer, and allowed to return to work in a light duty position that same day. The parties further stipulated that Palmer lost no time from work as a result of her injuries and that Alliance accommodated the light duty restrictions. At the time of her accident, Palmer had an average weekly wage of three hundred eighty-seven dollars and sixty cents ($387.60). On December 2, 2002, Palmer received a raise which made her average weekly wage four hundred three dollars and twenty cents ($403.20).
Palmer continued to work for Alliance until she was terminated on December 11, 2002 for cause. The parties additionally stipulated that the termination was for cause and completely unrelated to her job-related accident and/or injuries sustained therein. The stipulation included an explanation that Palmer unsuccessfully attempted to conceal a violation of the company's attendance policy and knew that the violation of the attendance policy alone could result in her termination. The stipulation went on to include a statement that the parties knew of no reason why Palmer could not still be employed by Alliance at a weekly wage equal to or higher than her pre-accident average weekly wage but for the "for cause" termination.
Reasoning that it would be totally contrary to the public purpose and policy of the workers' compensation law to allow an employee to violate company policies after being provided with a job that accommodates the employee's restriction and, in effect, hold the employer hostage to pay benefits, the WCJ denied Palmer's claims for SEB, penalties, and attorney fees. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the decision of the WCJ.
DISCUSSION
The sole issue before this court is whether or not Palmer was entitled to SEB after December 11, 2002. Palmer contends that regardless of the reasons for her firing, she is still restricted to light duty work and is entitled to SEB, with an earning capacity of five dollars and fifteen cents ($5.15) per hour for forty hours of work per week. Alliance, on the other hand, contends that as a result of Palmer's "for cause" termination, it is no longer responsible for any continuing indemnity benefits, including but not limited to SEB, after December 11, 2002.
We first note that the determination of whether an employee is entitled to SEB is necessarily a facts and circumstances inquiry in which courts must be mindful of the jurisprudential tenet that workers' compensation law is to be construed liberally in favor of finding coverage. Manpower Temporary Services v. Lemoine, 99-636 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/20/99), 747 So.2d 153, citing Daigle v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 545 So.2d 1005 (La.1989). Accordingly, we may not set aside the factual findings of the WCJ in the absence of manifest error or unless it is clearly wrong. Lacaze v. Alliance Compressors, 03-1566 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/14/04), 870 So.2d 1150.
"The purpose of SEBs is to compensate an injured employee for the wage-earning capacity lost as a result of a work-related accident." Lacaze, 870 So.2d at 1154, citing City
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