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Lawrence v. Bushart8/5/2005
r and State Treasurer were not proper parties to this action. Because Appellants have failed to establish how either of these parties is necessary to the disposition of this case, we must agree with the circuit court.
Appellants assert that the State Treasurer is a proper party because " nder Section 106 of the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 64.355, all fees collected by county clerks in counties with a population of over 70,000 are deposited in the state treasury." Because the State Treasurer is the recipient "of placard fees collected in the most populous counties," Appellants claim he is an appropriate and necessary party.
With regard to the DMV Commissioner, Appellants argue that he is a necessary party because "Kentucky law provides that placards must contain 'information the Transportation Cabinet may by regulation require.'" They also claim the placards bear the words "KENTUCKY TRANSPORTATION CABINET Division of Motor Vehicle Licensing" and that the Transportation Cabinet "is charged with authority to promulgate regulations to implement the placard program."
In its order granting summary judgment, the circuit court determined that neither the DMV Commissioner nor the State Treasurer "is a proper defendant in this action. They do not collect or administer these fees. These state Defendants (or their successors) have nothing to do with these disputed fees or the placards and have done nothing which would be subject to injunctive relief."
We agree with the circuit court. We do not believe appellants have sufficiently established that either the DMV Commissioner or the State Treasurer is a "necessary" and "proper" party. First, it is clear that the State Treasury is not implicated in the payment or retention of the placard fees. While it is true that KRS 64.350 requires clerks in counties with populations over 70,000 to remit the fees collected by their offices to the State Treasury, the Treasury serves merely as a repository. The remitted fees are returned completely to each county: 75 percent of the fees are used as funding for the county clerk's office; and the remainder goes to the county's "fiscal court , urban-county government , or consolidated local government ." This fact is clarified by the language of KRS 64.355, which states:
It is hereby declared to be the intent of the General Assembly that all fees of the office of county clerk...in counties having a population of seventy thousand (70,000) or more that are paid into the State Treasury pursuant to the provisions of Section 106 of the Constitution of Kentucky are the property of the respective county ....
Moreover, KRS 64.152 makes it clear that clerks in counties with populations less than 75,000 are authorized to retain the entirety of the fees they generate. The fees are utilized as a means of operating each clerk's office, and any surplus amount is paid over to the county's fiscal court. The clerks are not required to remit any of the fees to the State Treasury.
Since the State Treasury is not implicated in the payment or retention of the handicapped parking placard fees, we agree with the circuit court that the State Treasurer's connection with this case is tenuous. So we affirm the circuit court's decision to dismiss the State Treasurer from these proceedings.
Second, there is no evidence in the record that the DMV Commissioner has any connection with the handicapped parking placards or the fees collected by the clerks. The mere fact that the parking placards originate in the Department of Transportation does not provide a sufficient correlation between the DMV Commissioner and the present controversy to necessitate his participation as a par
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