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Cripe9/28/2005
ployment at will," two of which are implicated here. In Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 253, 297 N.E.2d 425, 428 (1973), for example, the Indiana Supreme Court determined that, while an employee-at-will may normally be fired for any reason, he or she does possess a cause of action for wrongful discharge when an employer retaliates for the exercise of a statutorily conferred right, such as the filing of a worker's compensation claim.
Subsequently, in McClanahan v. Remington Freight Lines, Inc., 517 N.E.2d 390, 393 (Ind. 1988), the Court recognized a "separate but tightly defined exception to the employment at will doctrine" when an employer discharges an employee for refusing to commit an illegal act for which the employee would be personally liable. There, an at-will-employee was informed "he was no longer employed" with the company after he had refused to drive an overweight truck through Illinois. Id. at 391. In fashioning this "tightly defined exception," the McClanahan Court noted:
If [employee] had chosen to drive his overweight truck through Illinois, he would have been personally liable for violation of Illinois law and subject to a fine. Furthermore, he would have been jointly and severally liable for the cost of repairing any damage to the highway or highway structures caused by his overweight vehicle.
Depriving [employee] of any legal recourse under these circumstances would encourage criminal conduct by both the employee and the employer. Employees faced with the choice of losing their jobs or committing an illegal act for which they might not be caught would feel pressure to break the law simply out of financial necessity. Employers, knowing the employees' susceptibility to such threats and the absence of civil retribution, would be prompted to present such an ultimatum.
Id. at 393.
In the present case, in his complaint, Clark alleged that Cripe supplied him with three unsafe vehicles and, further, that when he asked the company to provide him with a safe vehicle, Cripe refused. Thereafter, Clark "terminated his employment." Appellant's App. At 8.
Assuming arguendo that Clark's allegations are sufficient to demonstrate that, by requiring him to drive unsafe vehicles, Cripe forced Clark to commit an illegal act for which he could be subjected to personal liability, these allegations are insufficient to show that Cripe discharged Clark. Rather, Clark resigned.
In his complaint, Clark attempts to circumvent this reality by arguing that Cripe's action of failing to provide him with a safe vehicle was tantamount to a "constructive discharge." Initially, we question whether the constructive discharge doctrine-which transforms what is ostensibly a resignation into a firing-may even be used as a defense that an at-will-employee can raise in the context of a common law retaliatory discharge claim brought against his or her employer. Indeed, the practical effect of an employee's tender of his or her resignation means that the employer will not have to retaliate against the employee by discharging him or her. Put another way, we are not convinced that a constructive retaliatory discharge fits within the ambit of the narrowly-drawn exceptions to the employee-at-will doctrine. Rather, it seems that, were we to apply the doctrine of constructive discharge to demonstrate a retaliatory discharge, we would be overly extending that which was intended by the narrowly-defined exceptions.
Nevertheless, even assuming that the constructive discharge doctrine applies in the context of a retaliatory discharge, the allegations contained in the complaint at issue are insufficient to demonstrate a constructive di
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