 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Employee Leasing Services in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Meyer v. IBP7/13/2005
ficant causal occurrence on the date of injury thus established." Ellingson v. Fleetguard, Inc., 599 N.W.2d 440, 444 (Iowa 1999). Application of the rule simply requires a determination of when Meyer knew he suffered from a work-related condition or injury. Herrera v. IBP, Inc., 633 N.W.2d 284, 288 (Iowa 2001). An employee may gain this knowledge when an injury prevents the employee from working. Excel Corp. v. Smithart, 654 N.W.2d 891, 896 (Iowa 2002).
Applying these legal precepts to the record before us, I concur with the district court that the only possible manifestation date was December 22, 2000. This was the first date on which Meyer was referred for medical treatment, the first date on which IBP's health department kept him from returning to his shift, the first time he was given a light duty work restriction, and the first time he was referred for medical treatment. Although Meyer complained of swelling in his fingers and soreness in his wrist before that date, he was not removed from his shift, was not prescribed any medications, was not referred to a physician, and was told by IBP's health department that he was experiencing "break-in pain." Under these circumstances, a reasonable person would not have expected him to have known that his pre-December 22 symptoms reflected a work-related injury.
In reaching this conclusion, I have considered the fact that a pre-employment physical revealed some abnormalities in Meyer's hand. These abnormalities did not prevent Meyer from being hired by IBP as a permanent employee. See Smithart, 654 N.W.2d at 896. In my view, the physical exam, therefore, would not have made it "plainly apparent" to a reasonable person that Meyer sustained an injury that was work-related. Tasler, 483 N.W.2d at 829.
I have also considered the two medical responses to questions posed by IBP's workers' compensation examiner. In both instances, the physicians stated Meyer's injuries were "not causally related to 2 days of work activities at IBP." Because the cumulative injury rule does not require a showing of a causal relationship between the injury and a specified number of days at work, those opinions are irrelevant. To the extent the agency relied on these opinions, it misapplied law to fact.
Finally, I recognize that a determination of the manifestation date is an "inherently fact-based determination." Id. I also recognize that we will affirm "a determination of fact clearly vested by a provision of law in the discretion of the agency" if is "supported by substantial evidence in the record before the court when that record is viewed as a whole." Iowa Code ยง 17A.19(10)(f). Assuming the deputy commissioner properly applied the cumulative injury rule and the law on manifestation of an injury, I agree with the district court that her determination of the injury date was nevertheless unsupported by substantial evidence. The agency relied on medical answers to irrelevant questions. Those answers could not constitute substantial evidence in support of the decision. See Clark v. Iowa Dep't of Revenue & Fin., 644 N.W.2d 310, 320 (Iowa 2002) (stating agency decision may not be based on irrelevant evidence); cf. Taylor v. Chater, 118 F.3d 1274, 1278-79 (8th Cir. 1997) (stating an expert witness's answer to inaccurate hypothetical question is not substantial evidence).
I would affirm the district court decision which reversed the agency decision and remanded for proceedings consistent with the opinion.
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 Iowa Employee Leasing Services
Employee Leasing Services
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Employee Leasing Services in your area.
|
|