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Meyer v. IBP7/13/2005
e fact that Dr. Knudson, after examining Meyer, concluded it was his belief Meyer was "suffering from an overuse injury to his left upper extremity precipitated by his work at IBP this past fall and early winter."
We agree with the agency that this evidence does not support a finding that Meyer's work for IBP caused the syndromes. While Meyer said he had pain on December 22, 2000, there is no medical evidence that the pain he felt caused the syndromes. We agree that Dr. Knudson said his injury was from the overuse of his left upper extremity precipitated by work at IBP during the fall and winter. However, Meyer was employed by Advance Services for all but two days of this period and Dr. Knudson, as well as Dr. Gorsche, gave the specific opinion that the syndromes were not causally related to two days of work for IBP.
B. Legal Error
Meyer also asserts he is not required to prove the two days of work caused the injury. While Meyer must prove the injury is a proximate cause of the disability on which the claim is based, a cause is proximate if it is a substantial factor in bringing about the result; it need not be the only cause. Blacksmith v. All-American, Inc., 290 N.W.2d 348, 354 (Iowa 1980).
Meyer correctly argues there is evidence that he suffered a cumulative injury. Dr. Knudson and Dr. Manshadi indicated Meyer's injury was a cumulative injury, but nevertheless neither attributed its cause to the two days Meyer worked for IBP. The date of injury in cases of cumulative injury is fixed when the disability manifests itself, or "the date on which both the fact of the injury and the causal relationship of the injury to the claimant's employment would have become plainly apparent to a reasonable person." Oscar Mayer Foods Corp. v. Tasler, 483 N.W.2d 824, 829 (Iowa 1992). Meyer argues the date his injury manifested itself was December 22, 2000. The agency found there was no medical evidence that what happened on December 22, 2000 was a manifestation of the syndromes. Meyer has pointed to no evidence, medical or otherwise, that it was. We reverse the district court and affirm the agency decision.
REVERSED.
Huitink, J., concurs; Vaitheswaran, J., dissents.
VAITHESWARAN, J. (dissenting)
I respectfully dissent. The majority states "there is no medical evidence that the pain [Meyer] felt caused the syndromes." The majority concludes "Meyer has pointed to no evidence, medical or otherwise" that "what happened on December 22, 2000 was a manifestation of the syndromes." I disagree with this statement and conclusion.
IBP concedes Meyer suffered from left carpal tunnel syndrome and cubital tunnel syndrome. IBP also concedes this was a cumulative injury, defined as a gradual injury which results in the development of a disability over time. McKeever Custom Cabinets v. Smith, 379 N.W.2d 368, 373 (Iowa 1985). The only dispute concerns when this cumulative injury "manifested" itself. "'Manifestation' is best characterized as 'the date on which both the fact of the injury and the causal relationship of the injury to the claimant's employment would have become plainly apparent to a reasonable person.'" Oscar Mayer Foods Corp. v. Tasler, 483 N.W.2d 824, 829 (Iowa 1992) (citation omitted). Although the deputy commissioner acknowledged Meyer sustained a cumulative injury, she side-stepped the manifestation question and focused instead on whether Meyer's injuries arose out of his two days of work as an IBP employee. I would conclude that, in doing so, she misapplied the cumulative injury rule. See Iowa Code ยง 17A.19(10)(m).
As the Iowa Supreme Court stated, the manifestation rule "does not require any signi
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