 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Employee Leasing Services in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Meyer v. IBP7/13/2005
, Inc. v. Iowa Dep't of Transp., 650 N.W.2d 609, 612 (Iowa 2002). The provision "reaffirms the notion that courts must not 'simply rubber stamp the agency fact finding without engaging in a fairly intensive review of the record to ensure that the fact finding is itself reasonable.'" Caselman, 657 N.W.2d at 499 (quoting Arthur E. Bonfield, Amendments to Iowa Administrative Procedure Act (1998) at 68)). An agency's fact findings are binding on us if supported by substantial evidence in the record before the court when that record is viewed as a whole. Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(f). Substantial evidence is the quantity and quality of evidence that would be deemed sufficient by a neutral, detached, and reasonable person, to establish the fact at issue when the consequences resulting from the establishment of that fact are understood to be serious and of great importance.
Id. § 17A.19(10)(f)(1); University of Iowa Hospitals & Clinics v. Waters, 674 N.W.2d 92, 95 (Iowa 2004).
Evidence is not insubstantial merely because it would have supported contrary inferences. Nor is evidence insubstantial because of the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from it. The ultimate question is not whether the evidence supports a different finding but whether the evidence supports the findings actually made.
Missman v. Iowa Dept. of Transp., 653 N.W.2d 363, 367 (Iowa 2002). "The burden of demonstrating the required prejudice and the invalidity of agency action is on the party asserting invalidity." Iowa Code § 17A.19(8)(a).
III. ANALYSIS
A. Substantial Evidence
The district court held that there was not substantial evidence in the record to support the agency decision. IBP argues, pointing out our court's and the district court's limited scope of review, the district court erred in its holding and we should reverse the district court.
IBP points to the following facts, among others, as demonstrating there was substantial evidence to support the agency's decision that Meyer failed to establish his burden of proof: (1) Meyer was only an IBP employee for two days prior to reporting the injury, and (2) in response to IBP's letters, two orthopedic surgeons opined that, within a reasonable degree of medical certainty, the left carpal tunnel syndrome and ulnar neuropathy exhibited by Meyer were not causally related to two days of work activities for IBP.
Meyer argues the agency made incorrect or incomplete factual findings. The agency found, "No physician has specifically opined that [Meyer's] experience of pain in the left third finger on December 22, 2000 either produced or materially aggravated [Meyer's] left hand and arm problems." The agency relied on this finding in its determination that Meyer did not establish his burden of proof. Meyer argues this finding was flawed. Furthermore, Meyer argues the agency ignored evidence in the record that indicated the incident of pain Meyer felt on December 22, 2000 did produce or materially aggravate Meyer's left hand and arm problems. In making this argument, Meyer contends we should consider the following evidence: (1) the report of the physician assistant that IBP referred him to, which indicated that after experiencing a sharp pain in his left third finger and a popping and snapping sensation in his wrist, he experienced pain traveling up his arm and numbness and tingling in his fingers; (2) Dr. Sires's tests after the December 22, 2000 incident that revealed left carpal tunnel syndrome and moderate left ulnar neuropathy; (3) the physical examination that IBP conducted before permanently hiring him, which revealed some problems, but did not reveal significant problems; and (4) th
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 Iowa Employee Leasing Services
Employee Leasing Services
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Employee Leasing Services in your area.
|
|