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Sears v. Macon Water Authority11/2/2005
ical expenses other than those listed in C-7 would be paid by the Water Authority was not raised or addressed in the administrative forum. The parties stipulated that the medical bills contained in Exhibit C-7 were compensable if Sears prevailed, and the administrative law judge directed the Water Authority to pay the medical expenses contained in that exhibit. Neither the administrative law judge nor the Appellate Division addressed any issues regarding future medical expenses or other expenses beyond those contained in the exhibit.
On an appeal in a workers' compensation case, the superior court has authority and jurisdiction only to affirm or reverse as a matter of law and to sometimes give directions. The court may only set aside the board's decision where the board members acted without or in excess of their powers, the decision was procured by fraud, the facts found do not support the decision, there is not sufficient competent evidence to warrant the decision, or the decision is contrary to law. The superior court may not substitute itself as the factfinding body in lieu of the board. In fact, the superior court judge has no factfinding power, and where the board neither adopted the administrative law judge's findings nor made its own findings of fact, there is nothing on which a superior court judge could base a final judgment awarding compensation.
In this case, the superior court went beyond its jurisdiction by making a finding of fact regarding the compensability of all future medical bills related to Sears' heart condition. Indeed, by holding that no future medical expenses related to Sears' heart condition would be compensable, the superior court essentially made a finding that the fall no longer continued to be the cause of his disability - a finding of fact not made by the board. The court even went beyond the November heart attack and applied the finding generally to Sears' heart condition. These issues were not before the board. Regardless of the intent of the superior court, the language complained of in the court order in effect closes the door on all further compensation to Sears related to his heart condition. This is a significant adverse alteration of the board's award.
The judgment of the superior court is affirmed insofar as it relates to payment of the medical expenses contained in Exhibit C-7. It is reversed as it relates to future medical expenses. The superior court is directed to amend its judgment to remove the language regarding the payment of all future medical expenses related to Sears' heart condition.
Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part with direction. Ruffin, P. J., and Barnes, J., concur.
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