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Travis Pruitt & Associates12/1/2005
wanton and that supported a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress; there must be evidence that TPA directed such conduct toward Hooper. Jordan, 230 Ga. App. at 736-737. Hooper contends that she was terminated by TPA in retaliation for complaining about the harassment and that this was conduct directed at her by TPA which supports her claim. But even if a termination under these circumstances could be considered evidence of malicious, wilful, or wanton conduct or evidence sufficient to support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, Hooper is estopped from claiming that TPA terminated her to retaliate for the harassment complaint. This claim was litigated in Hooper's Title VII federal court action, where the district court and the Eleventh Circuit on appeal found that TPA showed a legitimate reason for terminating Hooper that was not a pretext for retaliation, and that Hooper failed to produce evidence that she was terminated in retaliation for her complaints about harassment. Because this claim was determined adversely to Hooper in the prior federal judgment (to which the claim was essential), that determination is conclusive in the present action and Hooper is collaterally estopped from relitigating it. Kent v. Kent, 265 Ga. 211 (452 SE2d 764) (1995); Shields v. BellSouth &c. Corp., 273 Ga. 774, 777 (545 SE2d 898) (2001) (collateral estoppel bars relitigation of reasons for employee's dismissal); Phinazee v. Interstate Nationalease, Inc., 237 Ga. App. 39, 41 (514 SE2d 843) (1999) (collateral estoppel bars relitigation of issue decided in federal district court judgment).
Hooper also claims that her intentional infliction of emotional distress claim is supported by evidence that TPA knew about Taylor's harassment and failed to take adequate action. When Hooper complained to TPA about Taylor's alleged harassment in March 1998, she specifically asked that Taylor not be terminated. In accordance with that request, TPA did not terminate Taylor but reprimanded him and directed that he have no further direct contact with Hooper and that any necessary business contact between Hooper and Taylor be made through a TPA supervisor. There is evidence that, after Taylor was ordered not to directly contact Hooper, he violated the order and made direct contact. Hooper testified that between March and August of 1998 Taylor e-mailed and called her; that he left a donut on her desk; that he left her a note stating he was not going to pursue her anymore, and that he left her another note stating that "It's not that bad - after all." Hooper said that she reported these contacts to her supervisor, but TPA failed to take immediate action against Taylor. Other evidence showed that, despite Hooper's complaints that Taylor was violating the direct contact ban imposed by TPA, Hooper requested that TPA lift the ban so she could have direct contact with Taylor for business purposes, but TPA's president refused to lift the ban. Finally, Hooper testified that, in August 1998 Taylor walked by her desk, glared at her and whispered to her to call him. At that point, Hooper reported this and earlier contacts to TPA's president, who then terminated Taylor's employment.
A claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress must prove four elements: (1) intentional or reckless conduct (2) that is extreme and outrageous and (3) causes emotional distress (4) that is severe. Mears, 225 Ga. App. at 638. Whether the required level of extreme and outrageous conduct has been shown to sustain a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is generally a question of law. Yarbray v. Southern Bell &c. Co., 261 Ga. 703, 706 (409 SE2d 835) (1991). But if there is evidence from which a reasonable
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