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Travis Pruitt & Associates12/1/2005
le, and Mears, supra, the long-established rule is that, where an employee "was acting solely for himself . . . there is no such thing as a master assuming, by ratification, liability for an act of another in which the master had no part." Reddy-Waldhauer-Maffett Co. v. Spivey, 53 Ga. App. 117, 119-120 (185 SE 147) (1936); Parry v. Davison- Paxon Co., 87 Ga. App. 51, 55-56 (73 SE2d 59) (1952). "An act can not be subject to ratification unless done in behalf of the person adopting it and attempting to ratify it." Lemmons v. City of Decatur, 215 Ga. 647, 648 (112 SE2d 597) (1960).
Thus, where an employee is acting exclusively for himself and is not acting at all for the employer, and does not profess to be acting for the employer, there is no such thing as a master assuming by ratification liability for the personal act of his employee.
Medley v. Boomershine Pontiac-GMC Truck, Inc., 214 Ga. App. 795, 797 (449 SE2d 128) (1994); Rubin v. Mikart, Inc., 167 Ga. App. 425, 426-427 (306 SE2d 420) (1983); Morgan v. S. C. Johnson & Son, Inc, 72 Ga. App. 444, 446 (33 SE2d 915) (1945); Healthdyne, Inc. v. Odom, 173 Ga. App. 184, 185 (325 SE2d 847) (1984).
The clear rule in Georgia - as established in the above cited decisions of this Court and the Georgia Supreme Court - is that an employer cannot, by ratification, assume liability for the tortious acts of an employee done for purely personal reasons entirely disconnected from the employer's business. Moreover, the rule has a statutory basis in Georgia as set forth in OCGA ยง 51-1-12, which limits ratification liability by providing that: "By ratification of a tort committed for his own benefit, the ratifier becomes as liable as if he had commanded that it be committed." (Emphasis supplied). The special concurrence does not dispute the decisions establishing the rule or the statutory basis for it, but apparently seeks to create an exception to the rule in sexual harassment cases. But the special concurrence misconstrues the effect of the rule by concluding that it results in employers "shielded from liability by the fact that the sexual harassment occurred outside the scope of the employment or the fact that the employer did not specifically sanction the acts of harassment." The rule does not shield employers from liability for sexual harassment in the workplace. Where, for example, for purely personal reasons an employee sexually harasses a co-employee, the employer may be held liable for its own independent acts or omissions by which it negligently or intentionally allowed the harassment to occur. The rule simply recognizes that the employer cannot under the principle of ratification assume liability for the employee's purely personal acts which are entirely disconnected from any benefit to the employer. There is no reason to treat sexual harassment claims differently from other intentional tort claims in the workplace. It follows that TPA was entitled to summary judgment on this claim.
2. Hooper also alleged in her complaint that, after she complained to TPA about Taylor's alleged sexual harassment, TPA negligently failed to take action to protect her from further harassment by Taylor.
As set forth in division 1, supra, the record shows that Hooper complained to TPA's president in March 1998 about Taylor's alleged harassment, and TPA reprimanded Taylor and imposed a ban on any further contact between Taylor and Hooper, except that, for business purposes only, they could contact each other through a supervisor. Even though Taylor was warned that his job was in jeopardy if he violated the direct contact ban, he directly contacted Hooper between March and August 1998. Hooper testified that, although she complained to
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