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Travis Pruitt & Associates12/1/2005
ual harassment alleged by Hooper was tortious conduct by nature intentional which occurred in the course of her employment by TPA, it did not arise out of the employment because Taylor's alleged actions were directed at Hooper for purely personal reasons unrelated to the furtherance of TPA's business and were not causally connected to a peculiar condition of the business. Murphy v. ARA Services, Inc., 164 Ga. App. 859, 861-863 (298 SE2d 528) (1982). Accordingly, the same facts which establish that Hooper has a common law cause of action also establish that Hooper's employer, TPA, cannot be held liable on the basis of respondeat superior for the alleged tortious conduct of her co-employee.
Under the principle of respondeat superior, an employer is liable for negligent or intentional torts committed by an employee in furtherance of and within the scope of the employer's business. Piedmont Hosp., Inc. v. Palladino, 276 Ga. 612, 613 (580 SE2d 215) (2003). The employer cannot be held liable on the basis of respondeat superior for an employee's tort committed "not in furtherance of the employer's business, but rather for purely personal reasons disconnected from the [employer's] authorized business . . ." Id. at 613-614 (emphasis in original; punctuation and citation omitted). Because Taylor's alleged harassment was directed at Hooper for purely personal reasons entirely disconnected from TPA's business, Taylor may be held liable for his actions, but TPA cannot be held liable for Taylor's actions on the basis of respondeat superior. Id. at 614.
Hooper claims that, even if TPA did not authorize the harassment, TPA may be held liable for emotional distress intentionally inflicted on her by Taylor's alleged sexual harassment because there is evidence that TPA ratified the harassment when it had notice of Taylor's conduct but failed to take action to stop it. In support of this claim, Hooper cites Wiley v. Ga. Power Co., 134 Ga. App. 187, 192-193 (213 SE2d 550) (1975), overruled on other grounds, Ga. Power Co. v. Busbin, 242 Ga. 612, 615 (250 SE2d 442) (1978); Newsome v. Cooper-Wiss, Inc., 179 Ga. App. 670, 673 (347 SE2d 619) (1986); Trimble v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 220 Ga. App. 498, 501 (469 SE2d 776) (1996), and Mears v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., 225 Ga. App. 636, 641 (484 SE2d 659) (1997). Like the present case, all four of these cases involved sexual harassment claims against employers where one employee sexually harassed another employee for purely personal reasons entirely disconnected from the employer's business. In all four cases we held that the employer could be held liable for an employee's intentional sexual harassment of a co-employee if there was evidence that the employer ratified the harassment after becoming aware of it. Wiley; Newsome; Trimble, and Mears, supra, should be overruled to the extent they hold that an employer can be held liable by ratifying sexual harassment committed by an employee not in furtherance of the employer's business, but rather for purely personal reasons entirely disconnected from the employer's business.
An employer may ratify tortious conduct by an employee, and thereby assume liability for unauthorized conduct, but for liability to be imposed on the employer by ratification, there must be evidence that the employee's conduct was done in furtherance of the employer's business and within the scope of the employment. Stinespring v. Fields, 139 Ga. App. 715-718 (229 SE2d 495) (1976); Wren Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Midland- Guardian Co. &c., 117 Ga. App. 22, 31-32 (159 SE2d 734) (1967); Frazier v. Southern R. Co., 200 Ga. 590, 593-595 (37 SE2d 774) (1946); OCGA ยงยง 10-6-1; 10-6-52; 10-6-61; 51-1-12. Contrary to the holdings in Wiley; Newsome; Trimb
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