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In re Ponds12/15/2005
ty." 513 A.2d at 796.
IV.
Having concluded that delay alone does not warrant a stay of the entire suspension, we now consider whether the Board's recommended sixty-day sanction is appropriate in these circumstances. We conclude, based on our review of the relevant case law and the conduct at issue in this case, that a shorter period of suspension is warranted after considering the effect of the delay and respondent's recent public censure.
In deciding on a sixty-day sanction, the Board noted that the conduct in this case was similar, in terms of seriousness, to the conduct in In re McLain, 671 A.2d 951 (D.C. 1996), and In re Butterfield, 851 A.2d 513 (D.C. 2004). In McLain, we ordered a ninety-day suspension for a violation of the predecessor to Rule 1.8 (a) (conflict of interest to enter into a business transaction with a client). 671 A.2d at 954. In Butterfield, supra, 851 A.2d at 514, we ordered a thirty-day suspension for a violation of Rule 1.7 (b)(1) (cannot represent two clients, with adverse interests, in the same matter) and (b)(2) (cannot represent a client if representation will be adversely affected by representation of other client). In respondent's case, the Board concluded that, " ike McLain, the Respondent here failed to bring a conflict of interest and the need for disinterested legal advice promptly and adequately to the attention of his client. Like Butterfield, the Respondent persisted in a representation that was too fraught with conflict to continue." The Board then concluded, "the present case is comparable in terms of seriousness to McLain and Butterfield and hence amenable to a suspension of 60 days in ordinary circumstances."
We will "adopt the recommended disposition of the Board unless to do so would foster a tendency toward inconsistent dispositions for comparable conduct or would otherwise be unwarranted." D.C. Bar R. XI, ยง 9 (g)(1). In re Jones-Terrell, 712 A.2d 496 (D.C. 1998), is the only other conflict of interest case in which a sixty-day suspension was imposed. In our view, the conduct in this case is not comparable to the egregious conduct of the attorney in that case, and therefore a sixty-day suspension is excessive and would lead to inconsistent dispositions.
In In re Jones-Terrell, the lawyer represented the Longs, who were the beneficiaries of the final survivor of Mr. and Mrs. Wallace. When Mr. Wallace died, Mrs. Wallace's attorney decided to sell the home in order to cover the cost of Mrs. Wallace's care. Id. Jones-Terrell proposed to Mrs. Wallace's attorney that she and her husband would take care of Mrs. Wallace in exchange for living in her home rent free. When the attorney rejected the offer, Jones-Terrell met with Mrs. Wallace, without her attorney present, and obtained Mrs. Wallace's signature on the agreement.
Id.
Subsequently, Jones-Terrell sent a letter to Mrs. Wallace's attorney, signed by Mrs. Wallace, terminating his services and informing him that she would be representing Mrs. Wallace. Id. Around the same time, Jones-Terrell also filed a petition for guardianship in Superior Court in which she lied and said that Mrs. Wallace's durable power of attorney nominated her to be Mrs. Wallace's guardian and conservator. Id. In addition, Jones-Terrell mentioned nothing in the petition about her relationship to the Longs -- the heirs to the estate. Id. The Superior Court denied Jones-Terrell's petition, and appointed a different guardian ad litem for Mrs. Wallace. Id.
We agreed with the Board's recommended sixty-day suspension. Id. at 500. Jones-Terrell was found to have violated several ethical rules including those involving conflict of interest, contacting a repr
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