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In re Ponds12/15/2005
r the lesser end of the permissible range for the type of misconduct involved." Id. at 716. The Board, after taking several mitigating factors into account, including an approximately two-year delay in the disciplinary process, recommended a one-year suspension. Id. at 716-17. We concluded, "under all the circumstances of this case and in particular the numerous mitigating factors, the purposes of bar disciplinary determinations will be sufficiently served by a suspension of six months." Id. at 703.
After Hessler, we again confronted the issue of delay in In re Schneider, 553 A.2d 206 (D.C. 1989). There, the Board recommended a six-month suspension because Schneider violated Rule 1-102 (A)(4) (dishonesty)by altering receipts in an effort to obtain reimbursement from his firm for his business expenditures. Id. at 207. Because there were "a number of significant mitigating factors" including the fact that the "disciplinary process ha dragged on into its sixth year," we concluded that a thirty-day suspension would better serve "the considerations that shape Bar disciplinary determinations . . . ." Id. at 212.
On the same day this court decided Schneider, we also decided In re Miller, 553 A.2d 201 (D.C. 1989), another case involving delay as a mitigating factor. Miller was also charged with violating Rule 1-102 (A)(4) (dishonesty). Id. The Board recommended a one-year suspension. Id. at 203. We concluded that the appropriate sanction was a thirty-day suspension noting that "we think the delay . . . in this case [six years] warrants a less severe sanction than that recommended." Id. at 206.
The next case in which we considered delay as a mitigating factor was In re Fowler, supra note 18, 642 A.2d at 1327. The Board recommended that Fowler be suspended for thirty days and that execution of the sanction be suspended due to the delay. Id. at 1328. In imposing the thirtyday suspension, without a stay, we noted that
hile we do not venture to opine under what circumstances time delay may properly mitigate an otherwise appropriate sanction, we do express the view that the circumstances of the individual case must be sufficiently unique and compelling to justify lessening what would otherwise be the sanction necessary to protect the public interest.
Id. at 1331 (emphasis added). We also noted that " hatever may be the unique and compelling circumstances sufficient to mitigate an otherwise appropriate disciplinary sanction necessary to protect the public interest, none such exist here." Id.
In In re Starnes, 829 A.2d 488 (D.C. 2003), we again considered the use of delay as a mitigating factor. The Board recommended that "although a nine-month suspension has been imposed in somewhat similar cases, we conclude that six months is sufficient to protect the public in this case, in light of Respondent's repentant attitude and the significant delay in the preparation of the Hearing Committee's report in this case." Id. at 490 n.3. Starnes argued for a further reduction of the suspension, but "we [were not] persuaded that the delay in concluding his disciplinary proceeding prejudiced Starnes materially or justifie a reduction of his sanction beyond the consideration that the Board's recommendation already show ." Id. at 490.
We also considered delay as a mitigating factor in In re Brown, 851 A.2d 1278 (D.C. 2004). The Board recommended that Brown be suspended for one year with a fitness requirement for reinstatement. Id. at 1279. The Board noted:
under ordinary circumstances, it would have recommended a three year suspension. However, given the length of time that the case was pending, through no fault of Brown, and Brown's inter
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