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Robinson v. United States7/21/2005
Argued March 15, 2004
Before WAGNER, Chief Judge, GLICKMAN, Associate Judge, and STEADMAN, Senior Judge.
Opinion for the court by Associate Judge GLICKMAN.
Opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part by Senior Judge STEADMAN at p. 30.
The exercise of peremptory challenges to discriminate against prospective jurors on the basis of race or gender is unconstitutional. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 88 (1986); J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 145-46 (1994). Each type of discrimination offends the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and "the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause." Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 616 (1991) (citing Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954)). This case concerns a claim of discrimination in jury selection based on race and gender, as the prosecutor at appellant Leon Robinson's trial used a majority of his peremptory strikes to exclude black women from the jury.
Appellant asserts that he made a prima facie showing in the trial court of unconstitutional, purposeful discrimination by the prosecutor against the black women in the jury venire. His primary contention on appeal is that the trial court committed reversible error in overruling his objections without determining whether the prosecutor had acceptable justifications for removing these prospective jurors.
In ruling as it did, the trial court reasoned that race-and-gender combinations are not "suspect categories" for equal protection purposes, and that Batson and J.E.B. therefore do not prohibit discrimination in jury selection against black women or other groups defined by the intersection of racial and gender identity. In our view, the trial court erred in its application of equal protection principles. We hold that the purposeful exclusion of prospective jurors because they are black and female is discrimination on account of both race and gender in direct violation of Batson and J.E.B.
We further hold that appellant made a strong prima facie showing of such purposeful discrimination. The trial court therefore erred by not demanding a satisfactory explanation from the prosecutor for his strikes.
We decline to remand for a belated inquiry into the prosecutor's motives. In this case, an inquiry years after memories of jury selection have faded would be inherently unreliable and unfair to appellant, the party with the burden of proof. Accordingly, we reverse appellant's convictions. He is entitled to a new trial before a petit jury selected without the taint of unconstitutional discrimination.
I.
Appellant was a seventeen-year-old black male tried in 2002 as an adult on charges of assault with intent to kill while armed with a shotgun and related offenses. It was undisputed that appellant shot S.M., also a young black male, moments after S.M. struck appellant's mother in the face with a metal pole and knocked her to the ground. The prosecution charged that appellant shot S.M. in an act of revenge as S.M. was fleeing the scene, i.e., without legal justification. Appellant claimed that he shot S.M. to protect his sister, whom S.M. was attacking with the same metal pole he had used against appellant's mother. Both appellant and his mother testified for the defense.
Before the commencement of voir dire, counsel and the court reviewed jury selection procedures and discussed the questions that would be posed to potential jurors to uncover possible biases or other grounds for exclusion. The questions approved by the court covered the usual areas, including prospective jurors' knowledge of the case, parties, and witnesses;
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