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State v. Latour12/13/2005
struck one prospective male juror, the defendant struck one prospective female juror and the court excused one prospective male juror for cause. In sum, ten jurors, nine of whom were males, had been selected, the defendant had exercised seven of his eighteen allotted peremptory challenges, five as to females, and the state had exercised four peremptory challenges, three of them as to males. It was when the defendant attempted to exercise a peremptory challenge of venireperson D.L., his sixth challenge as to a female, that the state objected.
The defendant argued that he should not be required to articulate a gender neutral reason for excusing the juror. Following a brief argument on what standard should be applied before requiring the defendant to state his reasons for exercising a peremptory challenge, the trial court allowed the defendant to excuse the juror without any explanation, indicating that it would see how things developed with the next three jurors.
The next venireperson to be questioned was E.W., a female, against whom the defendant also exercised a peremptory challenge. Again, the state objected, claiming a Batson challenge based on gender, and the defendant again argued that he should not be required to articulate a gender neutral reason for excusing the juror, suggesting as a remedy that the court instead impanel the female venireperson whom the state had challenged the previous day. The trial court noted that the state justifiably had excluded that female juror in light of her difficult disposition, but allowed the defendant to excuse E.W. without requiring him to assert a gender neutral reason, stating that the court would familiarize itself with the pertinent legal authorities as to whether such an articulation should be required. Later that same day, however, the court did express concern that it perceived a pattern by the defendant-- in that seven out of eight of his challenges had been against females, thus resulting in the selection of one female juror out of ten jurors--and hoped that this pattern would cease.
On December 9, 2003, of the fourteen females on the venire panel, the court excused seven for cause without questioning. Of the six females who were fully voir dired, the court excused three for cause, the state exercised its peremptory challenges as to two others and the defendant attempted to exercise a peremptory challenge as to the sixth female venireperson, L.S., after the court had denied the defendant's attempt to challenge her for cause. Claiming its right to invoke the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution to limit the defendant's use of his peremptory challenge to excuse L.S., the state again objected to the defendant's challenge. The trial court ruled that it would adhere to Connecticut practice, which does not require the party raising such an objection to make a showing of purposeful discrimination before requiring the party seeking to exercise the peremptory challenge to provide a gender neutral explanation for the challenge. The court then found that the defendant had excluded seven females through the use of his peremptory challenges and that the state had established a prima facie case of discrimination. Accordingly, the court ordered the defendant "to advance a nondiscriminatory explanation for [L.S.'s] removal . . . . [Thereafter], the state will have the opportunity to demonstrate that the explanation is [pre-textual] or otherwise insufficient. The state bears the ultimate burden of persuading the court by a preponderance of the evidence that the jury selection is tainted." The defendant then provided a nondiscriminatory reason for his challenge. Following argument on the issue, the trial court a
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