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Kelly v. City of New Haven9/27/2005
agent.' Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 [690 n.55, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed. 2d 611 (1978)]. . . . [In general] an official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity. . . . Itisnota suit against the official personally, for the real party in interest is the entity. Thus, while an award of damages against an official in his personal capacity can be executed only against the official's personal assets, a plaintiff seeking to recover on a damages judgment in an official-capacity suit must look to the government entity itself." [Citation omitted.]); Wade's Dairy, Inc. v. Fairfield, 181 Conn. 556, 561, 436 A.2d 24 (1980) ("Since they represent not their own rights but the rights of the municipality the agents of the same municipal corporation are in privity with each other and with the municipality. When a judgment is rendered against an officer of a municipal corporation who sues or is sued in his official capacity, the judgment is binding upon the corporation, and upon other officers of the same municipal corporation who represent the same interest."). Therefore, if the individual defendants are being sued in a particular count only in their official capacity, a judgment as to that count disposes of that count as to the city. We note, however, that, in the present case, the three operative complaints do not specify in any of the counts whether the particular count was being brought against the city officials in their individual or official capacities. Nonetheless, with the foregoing principles in mind, we turn to each of the cases.
A.
We begin with the Burns case, the last filed, but the one that is most straightforward as to the final judgment issue. The trial court rendered partial judgment for Beckwith, the remaining plaintiff, on count one of his amended verified complaint. Count one was brought against the city and all of the individual defendants and requested declaratory and permanent injunctive relief. The remaining counts name only the individual defendants and seek damages. In their joint supplemental brief, the plaintiffs state that "the equitable claims against the ity employees were against those employees in their official capacity, while all damages/monetary claims were against them in an individual capacity." (Emphasis added.) Because, under the posture of this case, that construction is reasonable, we conclude that the damages claims are not being asserted against the city. See Miller v. Egan, 265 Conn. 301, 307, 828 A.2d 549 (2003) (concluding that plaintiff's action not barred by sovereign immunity if complaint "reasonably may be construed to bring claims against the defendants in their individual capacities"). Accordingly, because the partial judgment in the Burns case resolves the only count brought against the city, it disposes of all causes of action against that party, and the requisite finality exists pursuant to Practice Book ยง 61-3.
B.
We turn next to the Beckwith case. The following additional facts are relevant to the issue of finality. Beckwith originally commenced this action on August 7, 2001, in the Superior Court. See footnote 1 of this opinion. In eleven counts naming one or more of the defendants, the verified complaint alleges that the defendants' actions with respect to Eligible List 00-31 violate the charter as well as Beckwith's federal constitutional right to due process and equal protection.
In October, 2001, the defendants removed the matter to federal court, and, in March, 2002, it was remanded back to the Superior Court due to a stipulation by Beck-with that all of his federal causes of action giving rise to federal jurisdiction were
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