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Kelly v. City of New Haven9/27/2005
ants, not exceeding three, who shall stand highest . . . ." Thus, the trial court permanently enjoined the defendants from rounding or otherwise altering competitive examination scores so as to create tie scores and to increase discretion of the appointing authority, and from applying the rule of three to broad score groups created by rounding scores. The court then rendered a partial judgment in each of the three cases, granting declaratory and injunctive relief. This appeal followed.
I.
The unique procedural posture in the three cases raises a threshold question as to whether the defendants are appealing from a final judgment. In each case, the trial court rendered a partial judgment addressing only some of the counts brought by the plaintiffs. Prior to oral argument, this court, sua sponte, ordered the parties to file supplemental briefs addressing this issue.
We conclude that there is a final judgment in only one of the three cases, the Burns case.
We begin with our well settled principles relating to final judgments. "Because our jurisdiction over appeals, both criminal and civil, is prescribed by statute, we must always determine the threshold question of whether the appeal is taken from a final judgment before considering the merits of the claim." State v. Curcio, 191 Conn. 27, 30, 463 A.2d 566 (1983). " e begin with the premise that, except insofar as the constitution bestows upon this court jurisdiction to hear certain cases . . . the subject matter jurisdiction of the Appellate Court and of this court is governed by statute. . . . It is equally axiomatic that, except insofar as the legislature has specifically provided for an interlocutory appeal or other form of interlocutory appellate review . . . appellate jurisdiction is limited to final judgments of the trial court. General Statutes § 52-263 . . . ." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Doe v. Connecticut Bar Examining Committee, 263 Conn. 39, 45, 818 A.2d 14 (2003).
"A judgment that disposes of only a part of a complaint is not a final judgment. . . . Our rules of practice, however, set forth certain circumstances under which a party may appeal from a judgment disposing of less than all of the counts of a complaint. Thus, a party may appeal if the partial judgment disposes of all causes of action against a particular party or parties; see Practice Book § 61-3; or if the trial court makes a written determination regarding the significance of the issues resolved by the judgment and the chief justice or chief judge of the court having appellate jurisdiction concurs. See Practice Book § 61-4 (a)." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Cheryl Terry Enterprises, Ltd. v. Hartford, 262 Conn. 240, 246, 811 A.2d 1272 (2002). The latter basis for deeming a matter final has not been satisfied in the present case. We, therefore, limit our inquiry to whether the partial judgment in each of the cases disposes of all claims against one of the parties.
That determination in the present case requires an additional step in the analysis because the individual defendants are city officials. We, therefore, must determine whether those defendants are being sued in their individual or official capacity. It is well settled law that an action against a government official in his or her official capacity is not an action against the official, but, instead, is one against the official's office and, thus, is treated as an action against the entity itself. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed. 2d 114 (1985) ("Official-capacity suits . . . `generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an
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